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In the last few years, the world has witnessed a fast expansion of bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies. From being mostly associated with criminal activity in their earliest years, 
cryptocurrencies have now taken a step into the legal business markets. The increased use of 
cryptocurrencies in business and commercial transactions entails that their appearance in the 
insolvency proceedings can be expected in a foreseeable future. However, the fast 
development of cryptocurrencies means that the current regulatory frameworks around the 
world have not kept up with the changes, which is especially noticeable in international 
situations. The continuous growth of cryptocurrencies and their value indicate that they will 
become very interesting for insolvency practitioners in the future, but the lack of regulation 
and case law within this field raises the question of how they will and should be treated.  
While cryptocurrencies continue to find their place in modern society, whether and to what 
extent they should be regulated in the international insolvency law is a vastly approaching 
issue. This thesis discusses the possibility of regulating cryptocurrencies on the international 
level of the insolvency law by examining firstly, the different risks and issues that the 
cryptocurrencies will give rise to in the insolvency law and insolvency proceedings with a 
special focus on jurisdiction, secondly, the current regulatory frameworks and principles on 
international and European Union level and lastly, the possibilities of regulation through both 
soft law and hard law in order to create a way to approach these problems. The possibility of 
regulation will be discussed in a multidisciplinary light, with the principles of international 
financial law as well as the nature of blockchain-based technology taken into consideration.  
The aim of the thesis is not to come up with a specific course of action, but rather to enlighten 
the most prominent pros and cons of different possibilities. The potential ways of regulation 
brought up in the thesis are the use of blockchain technology itself, amendment of existing 
legal frameworks, the use of regulatory sandboxes and a new legal framework.  
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Viime vuosina maailma on todistanut bitcoinin ja muiden kryptovaluuttojen nopean 
laajentumisen. Kryptovaluutat yhdistettiin alkuaikoina usein rikollisiin tarkoituksiin, mutta 
lähivuosina kryptovaluutat ovat siirtyneet myös laillisille liiketoimintamarkkinoille. 
Kryptovaluuttojen käytön lisääntyminen markkinoilla  ja kaupallisissa liiketoimissa tarkoittaa, 
että niiden ilmeneminen  maksukyvyttömyysmenettelyissä on lähitulevaisuudessa 
odotettavaa. Kryptovaluuttojen nopea kehitys tarkoittaa kuitenkin sitä, että nykyinen sääntely 
ei ole pysynyt muutosten mukana, mikä on erityisesti havaittavissa kansainvälisissä 
tapauksissa.  Kryptovaluuttojen jatkuva kasvu sekä niiden arvo markkinoilla osoittaa, että ne 
tulevat tulevaisuudessa olemaan mielenkiintoinen osa insolvenssioikeuden asiantuntijoiden 
työtehtäviä. Mutta sääntelyn sekä oikeuskäytännön puute herättää kuitenkin kysymyksiä siitä, 
miten kryptovaluuttojen kanssa tulisi toimia. 
Kryptovaluutat etsivät jatkuvasti paikkaansa nykyaikaisessa yhteiskunnassa, mutta kysymys 
siitä, miten niitä pitäisi säännellä kansainvälisessä insolvenssioikeudessa ja missä laajudessa, 
on nopeasti lähestyvä haaste. Tässä opinnäytetyössä keskustellaan mahdollisuudesta säännellä 
kryptovaluuttoja insolvenssioikeuden kansainvälisellä tasolla tutkimalla ensinnäkin erilaisia 
riskejä ja ongelmia, joita kryptovaluutat aiheuttavat insolvenssioikeudessa ja 
maksukyvyttömyysmenettelyissä kiinnittäen erityistä huomiota lainkäyttövaltaan. Tämän 
lisäksi tutkitaan insolvenssioikeuden nykyisiä laillisia kehyksiä ja periaatteita  
kansainvälisellä ja Euroopan Unionin tasolla. Viimeiseksi pohditaan  sääntelymahdollisuuksia 
sekä sitovalla että ei-sitovalla sääntelyllä luomalla tapaa lähestyä niitä haasteita, jotka 
kryptovaluutat aiheuttavat. Sääntelymahdollisuudesta keskustellaan monialaisessa valossa, 
ottaen huomioon kansainvälisen finanssioikeuden periaatteet sekä blockchain-teknologian 
luonteen.  
Opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena ei ole keksiä tiettyä toimintatapaa, vaan valaista eri 
mahdollisuuksien hyötyjä ja haittoja. Opinnäytetyössä esiin tuodut mahdolliset sääntelytavat 
ovat blockchain-teknologian käyttäminen, olemassa olevien laillisten kehysten muuttaminen, 
sääntelyn hiekkalaatikoiden käyttäminen sekä uusi oikeudellinen kehys.  
	
Avainsanat: Kansainvälinen insolvenssioikeus, Kryptovaluutta, Blockchain, Teknologia, 
Lainkäyttövalta, Sääntely 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
	
In 2009, an anonymous actor under the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto” launched the world’s 
first cryptocurrency with its underlying blockchain technology, the Bitcoin network. Bitcoin 
was created as a response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the aim was to introduce a 
new, decentralized currency that would not be dependent on banks and other financial 
institutions, but that would eliminate third party authorities and replace them with a 
decentralized peer-to-peer network system that is based on cryptographic proof.1 Although 
not the first digital currency, bitcoin came to pave the way for a new perception of the world’s 
financial system and how we look at money and has created a new financial era. Since 
bitcoin, many other cryptocurrencies have emerged, for example different altcoins and 
tokens/dApps, that have a total market capitalisation of well over 300 billion euros.2 
 
For several years, bitcoin was mostly associated with criminal activity. Due to its anonymous 
nature, it was the most commonly used currency on the dark web, which is mainly used to sell 
and purchase illegal goods, and it has also been used in connection with human trafficking, 
terrorist financing and financial fraud. 3  However, in the last few years, bitcoin has 
dramatically expanded, which means that it has also entered the legal business markets, and 
today some of the world’s biggest retailers, such as Subway, Whole Foods and Nordstrom, 
accept bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as payment.4  
 
The fast development of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies in the Internet and smartphone 
revolution means that the current regulatory and legislative frameworks around the world 
have not kept up with the changes, which is especially noticeable in international situations. 
In regard to criminal activities, especially bitcoin has attracted attention from international 
agencies like Europol, Interpol and the Basel Institute of Governance and some efforts have 
been made to regulate them.5 In July 2018, the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive6 by the 
																																																								
1 Nakamoto 2009, p. 1 
2 Houben – Snyers 2018, p. 29	
3 Azeff – De Caria – McGuire 2018, p. 2 
4 Cuthbertson 2019 
5 For example, in 2015 a Virtual Currencies Conference was organized by Europol’s European Cybercrime 
Centre and in 2016 Europol, Interpol and the Basel Institute on Governance established a partnership to create a 
working group on money laundering with digital currencies. (Demchenko 2017, p. 36) 
6 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 
(EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU 
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European Commission entered into force, which extended the scope to also include virtual 
currency platforms and digital wallet providers. However, regulatory authorities have 
generally been reluctant to deal with cryptocurrencies.  
 
On the domestic level, there are also discrepancies regarding regulation between different 
jurisdictions and the legal status and preferred regulatory regime varies. Some states have 
regulated cryptocurrencies in connection with illegal activities, such as money laundering, 
terrorism financing and organized crime, while others have regulated cryptocurrencies for tax 
purposes or regulated the initial coin offerings (ICOs). Some states have imposed restrictions 
on cryptocurrencies or even banned them completely, while others are more open-minded and 
are even trying to develop their own systems of cryptocurrencies. Within these states, the 
categorization and definition of cryptocurrencies also alters. In some jurisdictions, the 
cryptocurrencies are taxed as assets while in others, as a foreign currency. In some 
jurisdictions the ICOs are seen as a security while in others, an investment.7  
 
Insolvency law is an important part of the international financial legal order and the 
international trade.8 This means that the increased use of cryptocurrencies in legal business 
and commercial transactions has increased the likelihood of cryptocurrencies showing up in 
insolvency proceedings in a foreseeable future. However, this too is an area where regulation 
is lagging and where the definition of cryptocurrencies varies between jurisdictions. Much of 
the current insolvency legislation was adopted almost a century ago, at a time when most 
companies were domestic manufacturers with a lot of “hard assets”. But in the last decades, 
this has drastically changed. The companies today are more complex, more globalized and 
have other business structures and assets.9 Digitalization and the use of non-physical assets 
have also expanded. 
 
At the time of writing, there is no legal regulations or frameworks regarding cryptocurrencies 
in the insolvency law. The continuous growth of cryptocurrencies and their value indicate that 
they will undoubtedly become very interesting for insolvency practitioners (IP) in the future. 
The lack of regulation and case law within this field, therefore, raises the question of how 
they will and should be treated. According to a report by INSOL International in 2019, only 
																																																								
7 Global Legal Research Center 2018, p.1f 
8 Mason 2012, p. 107 
9 Hausemer et al 2017, p. 18 
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5% of IPs feel that they have a working knowledge of cryptocurrencies.10 IPs faced with this 
complex technology for the first time will, therefore, have plenty to deal with. Some of the 
challenges that they will encounter are how to categorize, recover and valuate the assets, 
given the cryptocurrencies’ anonymous nature and fluctuant volatility. 
 
The issues of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology are especially complex in cross-
border insolvency proceedings, since international insolvency law in itself lacks legally 
binding regulation. Historically, there has also been limited cooperation between jurisdictions 
in the insolvency law,11 and harmonization of legal rules has proven difficult due to social and 
cultural differences.12 The current methods for dealing with assets in cross-border insolvency 
proceedings will therefore be insufficient when dealing with cryptocurrencies, due to their 
borderless nature. The legal uncertainty in this matter could be considered a threat against the 
principle of legal foreseeability and regulation will therefore be needed in order to ensure a 
safe and foreseeable process and to assist the IPs in locating, securing and monetizing 
cryptocurrencies.  
  
In addition to cryptocurrencies showing up as assets, other developments based on blockchain 
technology are emerging that are changing the traditional nature and features of companies 
and their business. These entities and developments rhyme poorly with the legislation as it is 
today. There is therefore clearly a need for regulation within this field. But due to the 
borderless nature of blockchain, rules have been said to be adequate only when they are taken 
at a sufficiently international level,13 while still being proportionate so that it addresses the 
problems without strangling the technological innovation.14 This thesis will therefore focus on 
the insolvency law from an international perspective.  
1.2. Research Question and Methodology 
	
While cryptocurrencies continue to find their place in modern society, whether and to what 
extent cryptocurrencies should be regulated in the international insolvency law is a vastly 
approaching issue. There are various types and levels of regulation that can be applied to this 
new technology, and there are equally many different approaches to the legal characterization 
of it. The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the possibilities of regulation on the international 
																																																								
10 Draper 2019  
11 Mason 2012, p. 106 
12 Meager 2016, p. 27 
13 Houben – Snyers 2018, p. 54 
14 Ibid., p. 56	
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level of the insolvency law, with the research question being: how should cryptocurrencies 
and blockchain technology be regulated in the international insolvency law?  
 
The research method used in this thesis is the de lege ferenda-method. This method is a legal 
policy study that, with the help of artificial analysis, draws up recommendations for future 
regulation. In my research, I will evaluate and present various solutions on which the legal 
regulation of cryptocurrencies could be based in the future. The aim is not to come up with a 
specific course of action, but rather to enlighten the most prominent risks and issues with 
cryptocurrencies in insolvency proceedings and the possibilities of regulation through both 
soft law and hard law in order to create a way to address these problems. The thesis will 
particularly focus on these questions from a jurisdictional perspective. The possibility of 
regulation will be discussed in a multidisciplinary light, with principles and standards of 
international financial law as well as the nature of blockchain-based technology taken into 
consideration. 
1.3. Structure and Delimitations 
	
The thesis is divided into five chapters. After the introduction, where an explanation of how 
cryptocurrencies and the blockchain technology they are based on works is provided, an 
overview of the most prominent risks and issues that the cryptocurrencies will give rise to in 
the insolvency law will follow. The chapter is divided into three parts, which discuss the 
challenges that the IPs will face regarding cryptocurrencies in insolvency proceedings, the 
jurisdictional issues of cryptocurrencies in the international insolvency law and the risks that 
cryptocurrencies pose on financial stability. In the third chapter, the current international 
frameworks and principles of international insolvency law are presented and in the fourth 
chapter the possibilities and thoughts on future regulation of cryptocurrencies on the 
international level are provided, from both a soft law and hard law perspective. The thesis 
ends with some concluding remarks.  
	
Due to the limitations of this thesis, the highly complex question of how to legally define or 
categorize cryptocurrencies will not be discussed, even though this too will have an impact on 
regulation. The thesis will not differentiate between insolvency proceedings of persons, 
companies, cryptocurrency exchanges or banks, even though there are substantial differences 
between the insolvency proceedings of these entities, but will focus more generally on 
cryptocurrencies as an asset of the insolvency estate. Included in the scope are also new 
technological developments and entities that are underpinned by cryptocurrencies but do not 
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fall within the traditional definition of a company or organization. In addition to the 
cryptocurrencies, other blockchain-based technology is mentioned and assessed, in particular 
blockchain-based entities underpinned by cryptocurrencies, such as DAOs15 . Although 
cryptocurrencies are not entirely similar to each other they will all fall under the umbrella 
term of cryptocurrencies in the thesis with the blockchain-based cryptocurrencies in focus, 
particularly bitcoin.  
 
In the thesis, both international insolvency law and cross-border insolvency law are used as 
terms and share the same meaning. An international, or cross-border, insolvency proceeding 
involves one state where the proceeding is opened and at least one other state, where the 
creditors are located. In addition to this, complex cases and proceedings may include 
creditors, assets, operations and subsidiaries in several other states as well.16 The expression 
“insolvency proceeding” includes bankruptcy, liquidation, reorganization and winding-ups, 
which can be either voluntary or involuntary. The IP is a commonly used generic term for 
Insolvency Practitioner. The IPs are known to different names in different states and therefore 
expressions such as “administrator”, “trustee”, “liquidator” and “receiver” among others are 
used in different contexts of the text, mostly in regard to case law.  
1.4. Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology  
	
In order to apprehend the issues of cryptocurrencies in insolvency proceedings and why 
current legal frameworks are not adequate to deal with them, we must first understand 
cryptocurrencies. In this chapter I will therefore provide an explanation solely of how 
cryptocurrencies work and the basics of the technology behind them. Cryptocurrencies are 
difficult to define, since the word has become an umbrella term for a wide range of 
technological developments that utilize a technique known as cryptography.17 However, some 
definitions have been provided. The European Central Bank has classified cryptocurrencies as 
a subgroup of virtual currencies and defines it as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which 
is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members 
of a specific virtual community”.18 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also defined 
cryptocurrencies as a subgroup of virtual currencies and according to their definition “VCs 
are digital representations of value, issued by private developers and denominated in their 
																																																								
15 See section 2.2.1. 
16 Bufford et al 2001, p. 1 
17 Houben – Snyers 2018, p. 20 
18 ECB 2012, p. 5 
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own unit of account. VCs can be obtained, stored, accessed, and transacted electronically, and 
can be used for a variety of purposes, as long as the transacting parties agree to use them.”.19  
Like the aforementioned, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has approached 
cryptocurrencies as a subset of virtual currencies and defines them as “math-based, 
decentralized convertible virtual currencies that are protected by cryptography”. 20  In 
conclusion, although most international bodies share the same view of cryptocurrencies, there 
is no generally accepted legal definition. A good summary could therefore be that 
cryptocurrency is “a digital representation of value that (i) is intended to constitute a peer-to-
peer (“P2P”) alternative to government-issued legal tender, (ii) is used as a general-purpose 
medium of exchange (independent of any central bank), (iii) is secured by a mechanism 
known as cryptography and (iv) can be converted into legal tender and vice versa”.21 
Despite the fact that “cryptocurrency” is an umbrella term for many different kinds of   
cryptocurrencies, many of them are based on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), for 
example bitcoin.22 In his white paper, Satoshi Nakamoto describes this as a system that 
“timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-
work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work”.23 In other 
words, blockchain is a digital transaction ledger that consists of “blocks”, which are created 
when a certain amount of information is added to them. The information in the blocks 
undergoes a process called cryptography, which means that the data is generated into a code, 
or a hash, that consists of letters and numbers.24  
Every block contains a piece of information of the previous block, i.e. the hash, linking the 
blocks together. With several blocks containing each others cryptographic hash, a chain is 
made in a specific order. No blocks can be added in between the existing ones and therefore, 
the chronological order of the blocks cannot be tampered with, without changing also all of 
the previous blocks. If the data in the blocks are changed, a new hash is generated. Since the 
next block still contains the original hash, the system will break, which means that 
information in the blockchain cannot be changed.25  
 
																																																								
19 He et al 2016, p. 7 
20 FATF 2014, p. 5 
21 Houben – Snyers 2018, p. 23 
22 Daj 2018, p. 207 
23 Nakamoto 2009, p. 1 
24 Azeff – De Caria – McGuire 2018, p. 172f 
25 Ibid., p. 172f 
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Blockchain technology is today used in many different technological developments, but 
cryptocurrencies are the first and most developed type of blockchain technology. 
Cryptocurrencies were developed as money and their popularity is owed partly to the 
transparency and safety they provide. Since the data in the blocks cannot be changed, they are 
nearly counterfeit-proof, and since the information in the blocks is encrypted, the identity of 
the user and details of the transaction are anonymous.26 Cryptocurrencies differ from digital 
money on a regular bank account in that the traditional bank account records all the credit and 
debit transactions to the account and calculates the running balance after each transaction. The 
net balance can be seen as the object under ownership and is free to spend as money by the 
bank account holder.27 In the blockchain system, it is the recorded transactions in the network 
system that is of importance and can fall under some sort of ownership.28 
 
There are a few ways, through which crypto-coins can be acquired. A cryptocurrency user can 
simply buy the coins on a cryptocurrency exchange using fiat money or another 
cryptocurrency, or buy directly from another cryptocurrency user through a trading platform. 
This process is referred to as a “P2P exchange”.29 In some commercial transactions, the 
parties can use crypto-coins as payment. Another common way to acquire cryptocurrency is 
through ICOs, which means that a start-up company, which provides cryptocurrency, issues 
cryptocurrency tokens that interested investors can “subscribe” for with fiat money.30 This is 
commonly referred to as “token sales” or “tokens generating event” and the point of the 
subscriber is usually to support the development of a particular project or initiative.31 
 
Data miners are the ones participating in validating transactions on the blockchain by solving 
the algorithm and adding new blocks to the chain. This is called “mining”. As a reward, the 
miners usually receive units in return. Miners can be either cryptocurrency users or, more 
commonly, parties who have made a business out of mining and selling the coins for fiat 
money. Mining requires an incredible large amount of processing power, as well as good 
knowledge of computer science; hence many miners combine their forces and create mining 
pools to bundle computing power.32  
 
																																																								
26 The World Bank 2018, p. 24	
27 Fox 2018, p. 6 
28 Ibid., p. 7 
29 Houben – Snyers 2018, p. 25 
30 Azeff – De Caria – McGuire 2018, p. 175f 
31 Collomb – De Filippi – Sok 2019, p. 263 
32 Houben – Snyers 2018, p. 25 
	 8	
When acquired, the cryptocurrency units can be held in digital wallets, which has a public and 
a private key. The public key could be compared to a bank account number and the private 
key, that only the digital wallet holder has knowledge of, a password to the bank account. 
These two keys create a system of authentication and encryption that protects them from 
unauthorized access.33 The wallets can either be stored at one’s personal mobile device or 
computer, or at online wallet providers.34 Wallet providers are entities that provide e-wallets, 
which are used for holding, storing and transferring cryptocoins, for cryptocurrency users by 
holding the cryptographic keys. It is also common that the wallet provider translates the 
transaction history to the user, which looks much like a bank account.35 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
33 Azeff – De Caria – McGuire 2018, p. 175f 
34 Takahashi 2017, p. 88 
35 Houben – Snyers 2018, p. 27	
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2. Key Issues and Risks to Consider 
2.1. Cryptocurrencies as an Asset in Insolvency Proceedings 
2.1.1. Property Rights and Recoverability 
	
When a bankruptcy estate administrator is appointed in a bankruptcy proceeding to manage 
the estate, s/he identifies, locates and secures the debtor’s assets for the benefit of the 
creditors.36 If the debtor is the holder of a digital wallet, the estate administrator would 
naturally want to include the digital wallet in the debtor’s assets. However, in order to do this, 
s/he must first establish ownership between the debtor and the assets in the wallet, which 
raises questions of property rights. But what exactly is “ownership” and how would it be 
expressed in respect of cryptocurrencies? Is it possible to claim property rights of a digital, 
decentralized asset?  
 
The Court of Justice of the EU took the view that cryptocurrencies cannot be the object of 
property rights in its judgment on 22 October 2015:37  
 It must be held, first, that the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency with bidirectional flow, which 
 will be exchanged for traditional currencies in the context of exchange transactions, 
 cannot be characterised as ‘tangible property’ within the meaning of Article 14 of the 
 VAT Directive, given that, as the Advocate General has observed in point 17 of her 
 Opinion, that virtual currency has no purpose other than to be a means of payment.  
 […] 
 It is common ground that the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency is neither a security conferring a 
 property right nor a security of a comparable nature. 
The district court of Amsterdam, by contrast, stated that bitcoins do possess attributes to 
property rights in the case of Koinz Trading BV: 
 Bitcoin exists, according to the court, from a unique, digitally encrypted series of 
 numbers and letters stored on the hard drive of the right-holder’s computer. Bitcoin is 
 ‘delivered’ by  sending bitcoins from one wallet to another wallet. Bitcoins are stand-
 alone value files, which are delivered directly to the payee by the payer in the event of a 
 payment. It follows that a bitcoin represents a value and is transferable. In the court’s 
 view, it thus shows characteristics of a property right. A claim for payment in Bitcoin is 
 therefore to be regarded as a claim that qualifies for verification. 
 
In academia, the general perception is that cryptocurrencies can be the object of property 
rights, but this statement is not undisputed. Cryptocurrencies have been described as 
“censorship-resistant, digital bearer assets”. This means that the user who controls the private 
																																																								
36 Azeff – De Caria – McGuire 2018, p. 189f 
37 Case-264/14, Skatteverket v David Hedqvist 
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key controls the cryptocurrency linked to the public key and in that way could be regarded as 
the owner of it. The cryptocurrency can be used as a speculative asset as well as a medium of 
exchange. The “censorship-resistent” feature means that bearer assets entail that funds cannot 
be seized and transactions cannot be censored.38 However, the problem with this definition is 
the difficulty of identifying cryptocurrency users and digital wallet holders, since many users 
use multiple wallets from several providers at the same time. In addition, many users are 
using centralized wallets, exchanges or platforms, which pool the funds together in large 
wallets. The true owner may then be one name amongst many.39 
 
Another problem with ownership is that, as opposed to regular bank accounts, the 
cryptocurrency technology does not distinguish between the “true owner” who has acquired 
the cryptocurrency and a hacker, who has simply come across someone else’s private key. 
The hacker can easily transfer the units without the technology allowing for reversing or 
cancelling the transaction.40 In reality, there is also no guarantee that the personal key holder 
would have the key in his or her possession or that the personal key would not intentionally or 
accidentally be disclosed to third persons. 41 If the units in the digital wallet would be at the 
hand of several persons, the question of ownership would be complicated.42 According to 
economist Koji Takahashi, this would not “prevent the control from being characterized as 
exclusive since those persons have control to the exclusion of others”,43 but in regard of 
insolvency proceedings, it may create issues regarding joint ownership. 
 
Proprietary issues are also highly evident in cases where the online digital wallet provider 
goes bankrupt, since the holder are obliged to return the units (the assets) to the creditors. 
From a contractual point of view, if ownership cannot be established the wallet holder would 
be regarded as a regular creditor and have to claim for the assets amongst the other creditors 
in the insolvency proceeding, which means that s/he would only receive a partial recovery of 
the assets. However, if the wallet holder could ascertain ownership over the units, s/he would 
make a full recovery as the true owner of the assets.44 This was the situation in the perhaps 
most well known case regarding cryptocurrencies in international insolvency law, the 
Japanese MtGox case. The plaintiff requested recovery of bitcoins from the bankruptcy estate 
																																																								
38 Hileman - Rauchs 2018, p. 106 
39 Beckett 2019, p. 218 
40 Lansky 2018, p. 21 
41 Takahashi 2017, p. 83 
42 Ibid., p. 83 
43 Ibid., p. 83	
44 Ibid., p. 88 
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of the defendant, an online bitcoin exchange company named MtGox, claiming that he was 
the owner of them, instead of making a contractual claim with the other creditors. The court 
dismissed the claim on the grounds that the plaintiff could not be regarded as the owner of the 
bitcoins, since Japanese law limits ownership to tangibles as its objects and the bitcoins would 
be seen as intangible assets.45 
 
In the Russian case of Mr Tsarkov, the Commercial Court and Appellate Court of Moscow 
had to take a stand on the problem of property rights and recoverability. In this case the IP 
filed a motion with the court asking for a mandate to include the contents of a digital wallet, 
which was worth approximately 0.2 BTC (USD 2,300) at the time of judgment, to the 
bankruptcy estate of Mr. Tsarkov, the alleged owner of the wallet. The IP requested that the 
private key of the wallet would be given to the IP, stating that the bitcoins were to be 
considered an asset and, therefore, belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Mr. Tsarkov objected, 
claiming that since Russian law did not address cryptocurrencies, they could not be regarded 
as an object of civil rights.  
 
The Commercial Court ruled in favor of Mr. Tsarkov and stated that the legal nature of 
cryptocurrency is unclear since Russian law does not define it and therefore they cannot be 
considered property of the debtor. In addition, the Court took the anonymous nature of the 
cryptocurrency into consideration. Registration at <www.blockchain.info> is free and 
requires only an email as verification, which is not enough personal information in order to 
establish ownership of the digital wallet. 46 However, the Appellate Court took another view 
on the case and argued that any property with economic value of a debtor should be included 
in a bankruptcy estate and obliged Mr. Tsarkov to hand over the private key to the estate 
administrator. Be that as it may, in its ruling, the Appellate Court specifically argued that Mr. 
Tsarkov did not dispute the fact that the bitcoins belonged to him and the bitcoins could, 
therefore, be considered his property. The court also took into consideration the fact that Mr. 
Tsarkov had the personal key in his possession and that he was the only one to have it.47  
 
In conclusion, with so many conflicting judgments, the question of whether different 
jurisdictions will accept cryptocurrencies as digital assets that falls within the sphere of 
property rights in contractual agreements arises. This question has no answer at the moment 
and will likely cause much confusion in the future. Furthermore, if the ownership can be 
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established, the question of recoverability still stands. The IP will soon realize that his 
traditional tools to recover the assets are invalid since electronic cross-border transactions go 
beyond the limits of domestic legislation and insolvency enforcement mechanisms, such as 
injunctions or other precautionary orders.48 In general, blockchain technology is hard to 
handle “through regulatory instruments designed for physical world objects, (state) territories 
and jurisdictions”.49 
 
The question of seizing crypto assets was one of the issues in the PlexCorps case. In 
December 2017, a Canadian court ordered the arrest of PlexCorps and PlexCoin ICO founder 
Dominic Lacroix for contempt of court after proceeding with PlexCoin ICO’s business 
activities after being ordered by the Canadian Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) to cease 
operations due to investigations of fraud and crypto-schemes of the company. PlexCorps had 
already been sued by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S. SEC) for 
securities fraud and had their assets frozen and in July 2018, Lacroix was ordered by the 
Quebec Court to remit the bitcoins in his possession to the court administrator within 24 
hours. The following day, Lacroix told the court that he had been unable to transfer the 
bitcoins due to its complexity and the fact that his computers were held by the Canadian 
authorities. The issue was solved by bringing Lacroix’s computers into the courtroom and 
Lacroix was instructed to transfer the bitcoins immediately in front of the judiciary, with a 
warning that failure to comply would result in his arrest. The PlexCoin case is one of the first 
cases to handle seizure of cryptocurrencies from unwilling parties and will most likely set a 
precedent to the future on how to approach this matter and play a significant role in 
insolvency proceedings.50 
 
Hence, due to the anonymous nature of cryptocurrencies, IPs knowledge of the 
cryptocurrencies will depend on whether the existence of them is disclosed to them or not.51 
Problems therefore arise in cases where the wallet holder refuses to disclose their existence, 
or transfers the units to third parties. In corporate matters, the information about the 
cryptocurrency units can be obtained from the Company’s books and records, but in 
bankruptcies of physical persons, however, the cryptocurrencies would be easier to disguise. 
There is no public register of ownership of cryptocurrencies and due to the encrypted system 
it would be impossible to identify ownership without technological assistance. This could 
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definitely complicate things in cases where the debtor is not keen on the cryptocurrencies 
being found.52 
2.1.2. Volatility 
 
Another problem that the cryptocurrencies give rise to in the insolvency proceedings is the 
volatility. Cryptocurrencies do not have an intrinsic value53, but their value stems from supply 
and demand,54 and the only reason they are being used is that people “are willing to accept 
them as a means of payment”.55 Therefore, bitcoin among others has shown fluctuation in 
value over the years and gone from having practically no value in the beginning to more than 
EUR 17,000 in 2018 and EUR 7,700 at the time of writing.56 Cryptocurrencies do not rely on 
any authority to control the issuance, which means that it is the members of the blockchain 
network, the miners, who solve the algorithms and create new units over time.57 Some 
cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, have a set number of coins that can be mined. No more than 
21 million bitcoins can be mined and this number is expected to be reached around the year 
2140.58 It is therefore nearly impossible to keep track or control the fluctuation in value.  
 
Volatility is an important factor for IPs to take into consideration in insolvency proceedings, 
and especially in cases where there is a significant amount of cryptocurrency. It can be 
ascertained that cryptocurrencies are not reliable as an asset since there is no guarantee that 
their value will not suddenly drop to zero.59 The volatility also depends on whether the 
cryptocurrency should be converted to fiat money or kept as cryptocurrency. If the security 
arrangements set out that the cryptocurrencies “as is” should be transferred to the creditor, the 
risk of value is also transferred. However, if the cryptoassets should be converted to fiat 
money, the point of valuation will be very critical as the value can drastically rise or fall in a 
short period of time.60  
	
In the earlier mentioned MtGox case, the Tokyo District Court also had to face the question of 
volatility. The plaintiff claimed ownership over the bitcoins in the bankruptcy estate and 
requested a payment of money as compensation damages since he had suffered a loss of 
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53 Intrinsic value is a way of describing the calculated or true value of an asset. This is not always the same as the 
market value, which can be over- or undervalued.  
54 Maginnis 2018, p. 493 
55 Takahashi 2017, p. 82 
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57 Middlebrook – Hughes 2014, p. 818 
58 Fox 2018, p. 11 
59 The World Bank 2018, p. 30 
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7,666,580 yen due to a incline in the market value of bitcoin during the period he was 
prevented from using, profiting and disposing of the bitcoins.61 The dissatisfaction resided in 
the valuation point of the bitcoins. The bankruptcy trustee had valued the bitcoins at USD 483 
in April 2014, but in September 2016 the market value had skyrocket and they were worth 
approximately USD 1.3 billion.62 Since the court dismissed the claims on the grounds that the 
plaintiff could not be regarded as the owner of the bitcoins, he could not claim tort over the 
loss in market value.63 It would have been interesting to see, though, which position the court 
would have taken regarding the valuation of the bitcoins.  
	
Another problem with the volatility is the individual value of the coins or units. Logically it 
could be assumed that 1 coin would bear the value of 1 when it is paid in a transaction or 
exchanged for fiat money. However, the value of crypto-coins is not fungible, which means 
that the value of individual coins can differ. This is due to the unique hash codes of the coins, 
which enables the coins’ transaction history to be traced. If the coins can be traced to derive 
from criminal activity, they will be regarded as tainted. Tainted coins can be rejected or get a 
discounted value, especially in coin exchanges, which makes them inferior to clean coins.64 
2.1.3. Antecedent Transactions 
 
In most jurisdictions, the IPs are equipped with tools to challenge transactions made within a 
certain period of time afore the debtor is placed into insolvency. These mechanisms, generally 
known as “avoiding powers” or “claw-back actions”,65 are one of the most important aspects 
of insolvency law. If the challenge is successful, a court can order the transaction to be 
reversed, for example by returning the assets to the bankruptcy estate.66 This has proven 
difficult when it comes to cryptocurrencies, since cryptocurrencies allow anonymity and the 
transactions are nearly untraceable, or at least significantly difficult tracing. Some 
cryptocurrencies are even designed to avoid tracing.67 However, there are some methods to 
trace precedent transactions. All transactions in the blockchain are publicly available to 
everyone on the network and the blockchain contains specific information about the nature 
and context of every transaction, which means that links between certain transactions can be 
identified and traced back to a certain digital wallet.68  
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It is important to remember that, as opposed to regular assets, cryptocurrency units are traced, 
not followed. The difference between the two is that following is a process that entails  
“following of the same asset as it moves from hand to hand”, while “tracing is a process of 
identifying a new asset as a substitute for the old”.69 In other words, the recovery of 
antecedent transactions in insolvency proceedings would require assistance by highly skilled 
data scientists and would entail much additional cost to the insolvency estate. The IP would 
therefore have to consider whether the tracing would be worth it. In addition, although the 
transaction can be linked to a digital wallet, the physical person behind the wallet remains 
anonymous, or at least pseudonymous, unless the wallet in some way can be linked to him or 
her.70  
 
In In re Hashfast Technologies LLC, there was a question of recovery of bitcoins.71 The 
bankruptcy trustee claimed that the bankruptcy estate was entitled to recover a transaction of 
bitcoins that hade been made before the bankruptcy. The trustee sought to recover the bitcoins 
or the value of the bitcoins, whichever was greater in value.72 In the end, both parties 
voluntarily dismissed the case before the court could take a stand on the questions referred to 
it, but since crypto assets are difficult to track down and recover, this is a question that is 
likely to become an issue in the future.73  
 
Still and all, antecedent transactions are usually recovered through a court order. This usually 
requires that the bankruptcy administrator is aware of the transaction that has taken place. In 
cross-border insolvency proceedings it is the general choice of law rules that appoints the 
applicable law, through which the antecedent transactions can be recovered. Although there 
are rules about claw-back actions in almost all national laws there are significant differences 
between them, especially when it comes to assets located abroad.74 An aspect that will also 
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have influence on the recovery is if the insolvency law of the jurisdiction where the assets are 
located follows the principle of universality or territoriality.75  
 
Thus, for a successful recovery the bankruptcy administrator must firstly have the applicable 
law on his/her side, secondly, be aware of the transaction and in what jurisdiction the assets 
are located and thirdly, be able to recover the assets according to the law of the forum where 
they are located. In cases where the debtor has transferred cryptocurrency, it will be very 
difficult to find out to whom the coins have been transferred and in what jurisdiction the 
receiver is located. If this is possible, the next problem will be how to recover the coins if the 
jurisdiction, where the owner of the receiving public key is located, does not acknowledge 
cryptocurrencies as they are nor as assets of a bankruptcy estate.  
 
If the IP is aware of the assets but are unable trace or recover them, s/he could apply the same 
rules which are applicable in cases where the transferred assets have perished or in other ways 
no longer are in the debtor’s possession, i.e. the IP could claim for a restoration in money. 
However, this too could be unsatisfactory when it comes to cryptocurrencies. In addition to 
having a fluctuant value, the assets also include certain rights, such as right to vote and the 
right to be paid pro quota profits. If the IP claims for a restoration in money, s/he might 
receive a compensation of the value of the crypto assets at the time they were transferred, but 
s/he will not be able to exercise the participatory rights or be paid pro quota profits. These 
rights would still be exercised by the receiver.76 
 
If the IP makes the decision to proceed with the tracing of the antecedent transaction, there 
are a few ways to trace cryptocurrencies. The external transaction approach can be used when 
an external transaction is carried out together with the transaction of cryptocurrencies. If A 
buys goods from B and pays with 5 cryptocoins, IP can either trace the payment or the goods. 
Since B could have received the payment as purchaser for value without notice77 and any title 
that IP would have asserted against B would be extinguished, tracing the goods would be the 
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easier option. However, this requires IP to be aware of the transaction between A and B, 
which, as mentioned before, is not always the case.78 
 
The tracing through mixtures method is most commonly used when coin exchanges want to 
separate tainted coins from clean ones.79 Cryptographers use blockchain analysis techniques 
to test the origins of the coins they sell by looking at transactions of the same public key. This 
method can be divided into three approaches, the poison, haircut and first in first out 
approach. As an example, if B pays 5 of his/hers 10 cryptocoins to C, the question is whether 
this is the same 5 coins that B got from A, i.e. the “tainted” coins, or if it is the 5 “clean” 
coins. According to the poison approach, any output that derives from criminal activity is 
treated as 100% tainted by it, which means that both B’s remaining 5 coins and all C’s coins 
would be considered tainted. This approach, therefore, is very bad when tracing for private 
law purposes.80 The IP cannot assume that both B’s and C’s coins were derived from A.  
 
According to the haircut approach, the transactions are tainted in proportion with the tainted 
coins and the public key. Since 50 % of B’s coins are tainted before the transaction to C, 50 % 
of B’s remaining coins and 50 % of C’s coins would be considered tainted after the 
transaction. The taint is spread out to smaller and smaller amounts, and eventually it will be 
too small to be discovered. The haircut approach has been used in private law tracing, since 
proportionate sharing is customarily used in common law when assets are mixed.81  
 
The first in first out approach entails that the first transaction “to” a public key is regarded to 
be the first one out from the same public key when a transaction is going out of the wallet. 
Since all transactions are time-stamped, this method is relatively easy. The 5 coins that B paid 
to C would therefore be considered to be B’s original coins, and the coins B have left in his 
wallet is considered to be the coins that was paid from A. This method has been used in 
private law cases, but has fallen out of popularity since it is expensive and difficult in cases 
with many contributors. However, in cryptocurrency cases this would be a great starting 
point.82 This would also be the most logical approach when tracing cryptocoins in insolvency 
proceedings.   
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2.1.4. Financial Crime 
	
As noted earlier, cryptocurrencies have been a popular means of payment in criminal activity, 
but they have also been popular targets for criminal activity. Especially global exchanges, 
which are largely unregulated, have fallen victims of fraud and theft with reports of some 
980,000 bitcoins being stolen from exchanges since 2011.83 In fact, in the MtGox case, the 
reason for the bankruptcy was that 744,800 bitcoins held by the exchange were stolen or in 
other ways suddenly disappeared under unclear circumstances. Many cryptocurrency-based 
Ponzi schemes have also emerged a long with the technology.84 
Cointed GmbH was an Austrian cryptocurrency mining business and exchange and operated 
one of the largest networks of cryptocurrency ATMs in Austria and Eastern Europe. In the 
end of October 2018, the company filed for bankruptcy. Prior to the filing, the Austrian 
Economic and Corruption Prosecutor’s Office had been investigating the company on 
suspicion of serious commercial fraud, the operation of a chain letter and pyramid game and 
the violation of prospectus requirement in connection with the start-up’s ICO. A raid of the 
company’s office was made and claims of embezzlement ensued after clients of the company 
alleged that fiat currency had disappeared and client accounts ceased. The company’s CEO 
confirmed financial difficulties and relocated the company to China.85 The case is still 
pending, but the company is believed to have been involved in a massive cryptocurrency 
fraud, with over 100 Million Euros worth of damage to the investors who are now trying to 
get the stolen assets back.86 
Another cryptocurrency exchange, the Italian BitGrail Srl, announced in February 2018 that 
$170 million USD worth of a cryptocurrency called Nano tokens was stolen from the 
costumers through fraudulent transactions. In spring 2018, a customer creditor filed a 
bankruptcy petition for the company and in May 2018 Italian courts ordered that all assets of 
the company be brought under control of an appointed trustee. Instead of helping the trustee 
to get a hold of the assets, the BitGrail owner tried to reopen the exchange. The Italian courts 
then ordered all cryptocurrency stored in the exchange to be seized and transferred to the 
trustee.87 In January 2019, the company was declared bankrupt by the court and it was ruled 
that all seized assets, in addition to all the owner’s personal assets, be used to pay back the 
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creditors, since the court saw that the company had failed to install safeguards for the 
cryptocurrency.88 
 
The possibility of hacking and theft from unregulated exchanges poses a significant risk of 
insolvency to the exchange and in the absence of regulation there is no requirement that the 
exchange backs up the cryptocurrency deposits or transactions with actual funds. 89 
Furthermore, due to the specialized market of the cryptocurrency entities, other insolvency 
proceedings than winding-ups is unlikely to be tenable if the entity has suffered losses that 
would constitute its substantive asset base.90 Be that as it may, if a crime is recognized, the IP 
will naturally still want to return the stolen assets to the insolvency estate. As with the 
antecedent transaction, this will require tracing of the cryptocurrencies. If the tracing is 
successful, the IP will have to claim the assets from the jurisdiction where they are located, 
which raises question of recognition.  
 
 In 2020, the World Bank Group partnered with the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) and published a book called “Going for Broke: Insolvency Tools to Support 
Cross-Border Asset Recovery in Corruption Cases”. The book outlines how insolvency 
proceedings can be used to combat official corruption and recover stolen assets. As stated in 
the book, there are variations in legal recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in 
cross-border insolvency proceedings that the IPs who seek to recover the assets from foreign 
countries must keep in mind. In some jurisdictions, courts will recognize the foreign 
insolvency proceeding and issue orders at the request of the foreign IP who is authorized to 
act on behalf of the debtor. In other jurisdictions, the cross-border insolvency legislation gives 
the UNCITRAL Model law91 the force of local law, which means that requests for legal 
recognition can be resolved very quickly and routinely. Within the EU, the Recast Insolvency 
Regulation92 ensures that foreign IPs can exercise the rights and act on behalf of the estate in 
foreign jurisdictions.93  
In other jurisdictions, the IPs may have to seek cross-border recognition through the rules of 
international private law of the state. The IPs will have to request that specific measures 
ordered by the courts in the forum where the insolvency proceeding took place be recognized 
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in the foreign state where the assets are located. IPs may use treaties on legal assistance and 
recognition or execution of court decision for their request, but this method is generally very 
time-consuming and uncertain.94 However, these methods require that the cryptocurrencies 
can be traced and that the criminal can be located to a certain jurisdiction.  
In addition, a criminal asset forfeiture order could have the effect of removing assets from the 
insolvency estate, assets that would otherwise be available for distribution to the creditors. 
Correspondingly, assets held by third parties that would be the object of claw-back actions 
can be out of reach for the IP. In many jurisdictions, at the start of an insolvency case, all civil 
actions against the debtor are automatically stayed. The stay does not necessarily apply to 
asset forfeiture proceedings though.95 This creates a conflict between the state confiscation of 
criminal assets and the insolvency proceedings. The assets could be held for years, which 
would make the insolvency proceeding kind of useless in cases where the companies’ assets 
consists largely of stolen cryptocurrencies.  
2.2. Issues Regarding Choice of Law and Jurisdiction 
2.2.1. Jurisdiction 
	
Cross-border insolvency proceedings are becoming more and more common since especially 
large companies often do business and have assets in several states. The proceedings, 
however, are often inefficient and costly due to the differences in laws and legal systems in 
various jurisdictions,96 and to the lack of international legal regimes.97 Issues regarding 
jurisdiction and conflict of laws often arise in cases where the laws of several states are 
applicable. These cases regard especially “judicial recognition and enforcement of foreign 
proceedings and court decisions”, “recognition of the claims of foreign creditors” and 
“disparities in the applicable laws of the assets”.98  
 
The term “jurisdiction” has multiple meanings. First of all, jurisdiction refers to “the 
amenability of a defendant to process in such a way as will give a court authority to decide the 
controversy which that process seeks to agitate”. Secondly, jurisdiction refers to “a particular 
territorial or law area or law district”.99 Consequently, when a cross-border case reaches a 
court, the court must first consider whether it may claim jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The 
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court must have both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, with subject-matter jurisdiction 
referring to jurisdiction over the type of dispute concerned and personal jurisdiction referring 
to jurisdiction over the parties involved in the dispute. The concept of jurisdiction is an 
important part of the international law since a state that cannot exercise any jurisdiction is not 
regarded as a state at all. 100 
 
The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology imposes several 
jurisdictional questions in insolvency law that will need to be considered, since 
cryptocurrencies are borderless and many blockchain-based entities are not specifically linked 
to any particular state. The most eminent jurisdictional questions are therefore: where should 
the insolvency proceedings be opened and which law will govern the process?101 
 
In cross-border insolvency cases, jurisdictional questions are usually solved through the 
universality or the territoriality model. According to the more favored universality approach, 
insolvency proceedings are opened in the state where the debtor has its domicile and this 
state’s law should govern all of the assets of the insolvency estate, regardless of where the 
assets are located. This law is called lex concursus or lex forum concursus and is referring to 
“the law (lex) of the state where a court (forum) has opened insolvency proceeding (dealing 
with concurrent claims of creditors: concursus) and which court is (or has been) charged with 
hearing, conduct, and closure of the proceedings”.102 According to the territoriality model, on 
the other hand, the legal effects of the insolvency proceeding will only extent to the state 
where the insolvency proceeding is opened, and any assets or creditors located outside this 
jurisdiction falls outside the legal authority of the estate administrator.103 
 
Both the European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model law follows the 
universalist approach with the principle of COMI, i.e. the main insolvency proceeding should 
be opened in the jurisdiction where the debtor has its center of main interest. This is presumed 
to be “where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis”, “the 
place of the registered office” or the debtor’s “habitual residence”.104 In other words, COMI 
provides a right to exercise international jurisdiction for the national court.105 The idea behind 
COMI is to make the insolvency proceedings more efficient and predictable by preventing 
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parallel proceedings and restructurings.106 Possible secondary proceedings, however, are 
restricted to the territory of another member states and only to the assets located in that state 
and can only concern winding-ups.107 The principle of COMI will be further examined later. 
 
Cryptocurrencies and other blockchain developments, such as decentralized autonomous 
organizations (DAOs), does not work well with principle of COMI, though. DAOs are 
organizations based on forms of autonomous code. They have no central governance, they are 
not run by humans and their existence is not based on legal contracts or employment contracts 
as opposed to traditional companies. Ownership and control becomes thus less prominent in 
these organizations.108 DAOs generally consist of a collection of smart contracts and rely on 
digital currencies to fund their operations.109 The blockchain code of the DAOs allows people 
from all over the world to enter into a series of transactions and creates a partnership-like 
entity that can exist, attract new investors and make decisions by majority voting of its 
users.110 
 
The DAOs are a big threat to the principle of COMI, since its decentralized nature will make 
it difficult to find linking factors between the entity and a certain jurisdictions since there are 
no management or physical assets and the stakeholders are scattered around the globe. In 
addition, the legal status of DAOs is still very unclear, which would make it very difficult to 
commence an insolvency proceeding of a DAO.111 Moreover, The DAOs are only one 
example of entities that do not work well with the current insolvency provisions and could be 
considered to be the most extreme at this point, but with the technological expansion that the 
world is facing these days, there is only a question of time before other developments will 
appear in different forms and shapes. It is also important to remember that there are also 
middle forms of these entities that are not as decentralized as DAOs but can still be puzzling. 
For example, the corporate entity might meet the requirement of a registered office but 
contain technological features that might arise a rebuttal of the statement of COMI in the 
cryptocurrency trading world. The IP seeking recognition of a proceeding as a foreign main 
proceeding might therefore notice that the COMI test is not enough.112 
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2.2.2. Choice of Law  
	
If the question of forum can be established, the issue of which law will govern the process 
still stands.113 The traditional starting point is that courts will apply the insolvency law of the 
forum where the insolvency proceeding is opened (lex fori). This reflects both the public 
policy references in the law and the objective of a more efficient conduct of proceedings on 
the basis of familiarity with the domestic insolvency regime.114 But since there is little 
legislative guidance on dealing with cryptocurrencies in most countries of the world, and 
there are substantial differences between how cryptocurrencies are perceived and categorized, 
there will be differences in the result achieved through the application of the rules in one 
jurisdiction compared to another. The questions that will arise are therefore: which category 
of law will apply to cryptocurrencies? And which juridical concepts can be applied to them if 
they are not legally categorized as anything?115  
 
Another issue arises in cases where the law of the forum is not the most logical approach, e.g. 
in cases where a cryptocurrency exchange goes bankrupt and the competing claimants are 
from different jurisdictions. In many jurisdictions, the lex rei sitae is the basic rule on which 
law will govern the insolvency process, i.e. the law of the place where the property is situated. 
But where are the cryptoassets located? Is it the location of the digital wallet? Is it the location 
of the blockchain itself? Or is it the location of the exchange used by the digital wallet 
holder?116 The physical location of the wallet would be a good starting point, i.e. the location 
of the online wallet or the machine where it is located. The problem with the location of the 
wallet, however, is that it is merely a digital proof of ownership and that a number of backups 
of the wallet can exist anywhere. In addition, possession of the key to the wallet does not 
necessarily state an ownership over the assets, only a right to access them, the question of 
where the wallet is located therefore remains.  
 
The location of the blockchain is problematic in the way that it is mere data. Data can be 
stored on a physical server, which could mean that it is store within the jurisdiction where the 
insolvency proceeding was commenced, or it can be stored on a cloud server. If it is stored on 
a cloud server, the data could be in another jurisdiction on the other side of the globe, which 
could make it inaccessible due to appropriate recognition and ancillary orders.117 The problem 
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with the location of the exchange platforms or companies used is that the exchange entity may 
not follow a traditional corporate structure and simply does not have a physical office or 
physical assets, but still engage customers on a global scale.118 For example in the Mt Gox 
bankruptcy, the only physical assets listed were two servers, 28 laptops and one chair.119 
 
A new general rule has therefore been proposed, the lex creationis (the law under which an 
intangible is created), which would be the most theoretically sound and practical rule for 
resolving competing proprietary claims to intangibles. The rules is said to have found 
expression in the property choice of law rules for contract debts, shares, intellectual property 
and rights of suit in tort and the rules for assignability of debts. There are two main objections 
for the lex creationis rule regarding cryptocurrencies, though. The first one is a discomfort 
with applying the law governing a contract to a question of proprietary. The rule is not limited 
to rights created by contract, but covers intangibles with no consensual origin at all, for which 
the objection has no force. Even when a contract provides rights itself, the rule is governing 
the proprietary issues because the right exists in the law governing the contract, and not 
because of the agreement.120 
 
The second main objective is that the rule would apply a contractual choice of law rule to 
proprietary issues. This is however not the case. The issue remains proprietary and again, the 
rule applies whether the source of the right is in the agreement or in another area of law. It is 
however difficult to apply the lex creationis rule to cryptocurrencies, since the 
cryptocurrencies are not an obligation in contract or tort. Cryptocurrencies’ existence is 
independent of any law. There is therefore no law that could be considered the source of 
cryptocurrencies and the lex creationis cannot be applied.121 
2.2.3. Regulatory Arbitrage 
	
Although international insolvency law is commonly associated with failed or failing 
businesses, insolvency law is also an important risk factor to regard when considering 
international investment and the expansion of business abroad.122 The discrepancies in 
insolvency regimes, which are based on social and cultural differences, means that a 
potentially failing company will be treated differently depending on the jurisdiction and 
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different interests will have different status.123 Some of the factors that will have an impact on 
the outcome are whether the insolvency estate comprises local and foreign assets, to which 
extent foreign creditors claims are recognized, the effect of the insolvency on antecedent or 
incomplete transactions and the recognition of the proceeding in other jurisdictions.124 
 
An irregular regulatory landscape, ascribed to the differences in national regulation, creates 
the possibility to circumvent certain rules and legislation to more favorable ones. This concept 
is known as regulatory arbitrage.125 From a financial theory perspective, the investment 
strategy in regulatory arbitrage is that someone seeks to profit from discrepancies in two 
different markets by choosing the one with the lowest cost or the one that is the most 
favorable considering the risks.126 There are two different types of regulatory arbitrage. 
Jurisdictional arbitrage takes advantage of differences in law from different jurisdictions, 
while categorical arbitrage exploits a legal discrepancy in treatment of activities or products 
that are functionally similar.127  
 
In the field of cryptocurrencies, many crypto exchanges, among others, have taken advantage 
of regulatory arbitrage to find jurisdictions with a more relaxed regulatory regime.128 
Furthermore, cryptocurrencies have been stated to pose “a real risk of regulatory arbitrage”,129 
which is not surprising considering the many various approaches to cryptocurrencies existing 
across the globe. Tech firms have in general shown a great interest towards regulatory 
arbitrage, since they often are startups and regulation is lagging behind130 and the technology 
does not fit into already existing categorizations.131 
 
So why is regulatory arbitrage an issue? Well, the problem is that the invested companies that 
are set up in a certain jurisdiction have a profound investment effect on that jurisdiction and 
its market, yet are still out of reach for the state’s regulation, which could create a “race to the 
bottom” effect.132 In addition, the jurisdictions are often chosen not in favor of their national 
laws, but because of the rules created by market participants themselves and enshrined in 
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contracts, which are then deemed enforceable by states, even though the rules created by 
market participants are not socially optimal for the states enforcing the contracts. The impact 
of regulatory arbitrage in such scenarios is to eliminate the differences between state rules and 
non-state rules. 133  Another problem is that regulatory arbitrage “distorts regulatory 
competition, shifts costs, and undermines the rule of law”.134  
 
Reputedly, the only remedy against regulatory arbitrage is harmonization of legal rules on a 
global level. 135  As mentioned before, this has been proven difficult. Therefore, other 
approaches to this problem have been presented. Professor Annelise Riles has criticized the 
“harmonization approach”, due to it being “an extremely contentious and difficult process” to 
harmonize national laws, and proposed a development of the conflict of laws rules instead. 
According to the “conflicts approach”, the counteract to regulatory arbitrage is to “define 
under what circumstance a particular dispute or problem shall be subject to one state’s law or 
another”. The advantages of this approach is that it provides a more sophisticated and 
manageable approach to answering practical questions and that it requires no new legislation 
and no new agreements to be fought through. The only thing it requires is a more forceful and 
creative application of the already existing legal systems.136  
 
Another approach that has been suggested is the improvement of the drafting of laws and to 
use anti-avoidance regimes. According to this approach, the crafting of new legal rules that 
accurately track the economic substance of transactions will reduce the risk of regulatory 
arbitrage by simple reducing the legal gap that is taken advantage of.137 Nevertheless, 
regulatory arbitrage is a considerable problem, especially to new emerging tech firms. 
Different solutions have been suggested to fight this problem but what they all have in 
common is that law making will be part of the solution. It is important that the law making 
favors technological development, while still reduces social harm. When regulating 
cryptocurrencies in the international insolvency law, the regulatory arbitrage should therefore 
be taken into consideration. If there are no significant differences between different states, the 
appeal to find more relaxed regimes will fade.  
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2.3. Risk to Global Financial Stability 
2.3.1. Systemic Risk 
	
Insolvency law has been described as “the root of commercial and financial law”,138 which 
means that although it “does not constitute direct regulation of the financial market, it 
significantly affects the market and the way its participants behave”.139 Insolvency laws come 
into question when corporations and other entities exit from the economic system and have a 
great impact on the losses that might occur. The insolvency law is therefore an important part 
of financial stability in terms of credit and systemic risk. 140 When the insolvency proceeding 
concerns a financial institution, such as a bank, the impact on financial stability is even 
greater. Along with this is the risk that cryptocurrencies pose to financial stability, which has 
been analysed by different authorities and which goes beyond the borders of the insolvency 
law. However, the risks to financial stability in general by cryptocurrencies should also be 
taken into consideration when regulating the insolvency law.  
	
In 2012, a working paper published by the European Central Bank (ECB) analyzed virtual 
currencies’ risks to price stability, financial stability and payment system stability. Financial 
stability is defined by the ECB “as the condition in which the financial system - comprising 
financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of withstanding 
shocks, thereby mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation process 
which are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable 
investment opportunities”.141 The analysis concluded that cryptocurrencies “do not pose a risk 
to price stability, provided that money creation continues to stay at a low level” and that they 
“tend to be inherently unstable, but cannot jeopardize financial stability, owing to their 
limited connection with the real economy, their low volume traded and a lack of wide user 
acceptance”.142  
In a further analysis made in 2015, ECB states that “although [virtual currencies] can have 
positive aspects in terms of financial innovation and the provision of additional payment 
alternatives for consumers, it is clear that they also entail risks”. However, regarding 
monetary policy, price stability and financial stability, the risks remain low.143 Some of the 
risks mentioned are lack of transparency, absence or unclarity of legal status, lack of 
																																																								
138 Mason 2012, p. 106	
139 Rydl 2006, p. 93 
140 Rydl 2006, p. 93 
141 ECB 2012, p. 37 
142 Ibid., p. 6 
143 ECB 2015, p. 4 
	 28	
continuity (e.g. discontinued as a result of bankruptcy), high IT dependency, anonymity (e.g. 
risk of breach of contract) and high volatility.144 ECB concludes, though, that these risks’ 
impact on price stability and financial stability will remain low and will only become a 
problem if ”(i) [virtual currencies] become more widely used in regular payments; (ii) greater 
links to the real economy develop […] and (iii) no structural developments are envisaged that 
would make VCS inherently more stable”.145 
The opinion on cryptocurrencies’ risks to financial stability has long followed the same 
pattern. In April 2018, an analysis on monetary policy ordered by the European Parliament 
concluded: “Despite their technological advances and global reach, VCs are far from being 
able to challenge the dominant position of sovereign currencies and the monetary policies of 
central banks, especially in major currency areas.”.146 The authors claim that one of the 
reasons for this is that “as long as major trading platforms and financial intermediaries do not 
accept payments in VCs, their transactional role will remain limited and they will fulfill 
mainly the third function of money, the store of value – that is, they will serve as one of many 
investment assets”.147 Be that as it may, the small but still possible risks mentioned in the 
analysis are risks of crime, volatility, regulatory arbitrage and currency substitution, i.e. a 
situation where a country suffering from macroeconomic or political instability and 
uncertainty choses to abandon its own currency in favor of another.148 
 
In October 2018, the Financial Stability Board issued a report on potential financial stability 
implications from crypto assets. According to the report, the primary risks to financial 
stability are market liquidity risks, volatility risks, leverage risks, risk of fraud and 
technological and operational risks.149 In addition to these, the cryptocurrencies also pose a 
broader policy concern, e.g risks to consumer and investor protection and market integrity, 
money laundering, terrorist financing, sanctions evasion, fraud and other illicit financing 
risks.150 Nevertheless, cryptocurrencies do not state a significant risk to financial stability at 
present. If they were to become more actively traded by financial institutions or used by the 
general public, a reassessment of the implications on financial stability would have to be 
made.151  
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In 2019, the chair of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Randal Quarles wrote in a letter to 
G20 that ”crypto-assets do not pose a threat to global financial stability at this point, but that 
they remain vigilant to existing and emerging risks”.152 Especially global stablecoins153 
”could pose a host of challenges to the regulatory community, not least because they have the 
potential to become systemically important, including through the substitution of domestic 
currencies. These include challenges for financial stability; consumer and investor protection; 
data privacy and protection; financial integrity including AML/CFT and know-your-customer 
compliance; mitigation of tax evasion; fair competition and anti-trust policy; market integrity; 
sound and efficient governance; cyber security and operational risks; and an appropriate legal 
basis.”. Due to these risks, a G7 working group will continue to monitor and analyse crypto 
assets and their effect on financial stability, and examine the regulatory issues they generate 
and in July 2020, a final report on the matter will be submitted.154  
Thus, the common view among authorities has been and is that cryptocurrencies pose a 
plausible but small risk factor on financial stability at the moment and the main argument for 
this has been the modest use of cryptocurrencies. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
cryptocurrencies are becoming more and more accepted as a means of payment in commercial 
transactions, which means that they will soon have much more influence on the economic 
market than they have now. Some skeptical scholars have therefore another viewpoint on this 
matter and consider cryptocurrencies a major threat to financial stability. 
The economist Jon Danielsson argues that ”if private cryptocurrencies were to find 
widespread economic use, either coexisting with or fully displacing fiat money, the result 
would be increased financial stability, inequality, and social instability”.155 Danielsson agrees 
that cryptocurrencies do not threaten financial stability today, but if the markets were to see 
an increase in the day-to-day use of cryptocurrencies, as they probably will, the 
cryptocurrency-based monetary system will create forms of instability, both known and 
unknown to the current markets.156 While fiat systems share the same risks, they have a safety 
valve. Cryptocurrencies like bitcoin cannot create more money since they have a fixed mining 
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schedule, which means that other cryptocurrencies would have to be included in a time of 
crisis. Fiat systems are therefore more stable and have a bigger chance of minimizing failures 
and keeping the economy going than cryptocurrency systems. In conclusion, cryptocurrency 
systems involves a greater systemic risk than fiat systems.157  
In February 2018, the president of the European Central Bank expressed the importance of 
identifying the risks that cryptocurrencies pose. According to him, although supervised 
institutions have not shown a great interest in cryptocurrencies, the public definitely has. The  
high-volatile and unregulated cryptocurrencies must therefore ”be regarded as very risky 
assets”. Hence, work is under way in the Single Supervisory Mechanism158 to identify the 
risks that cryptocurrencies could pose on the institutions.159 
In conclusion, it can be ascertained that authorities has adopted a humble view in regard to the 
systemic risk of cryptocurrencies but as Danielsson points out, it is important to remember 
that cryptocurrency is a type of ”currency” that the world has not earlier experienced. It is 
therefore important to also take into consideration the untraditional and unexpected risks that 
might occur. In addition, since cryptocurrency lacks a central point of governance, it is even 
more difficult to point out who is responsible if the cryptocurrency system would suddenly 
crash. For this reason, it is important that the analysis conducted of the systemic risk that 
cryptocurrency involves go beyond the traditional scope and thinking.  
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3. Current Regulatory Regime in the International Insolvency 
Law 
3.1. International Level 
3.1.1. UNCITRAL Works 
	
In order to consider a reform of or new regime in a judicial area, it is important to have 
knowledge of the existing legal frameworks and sources. The existing sources in the 
international insolvency law can be divided into (i) international treaties and conventions; (ii) 
other international rules and model laws; (iii) the sources of the European Union (EU); (iv) 
private international law; (v) recognized principles; and (vi) comity of law.160 Some scholars 
also claim that certain aspects of the international insolvency law should be seen as customary 
international law, however, this has been debated.161 At the time of writing, none of the 
sources of international insolvency law contains any provisions about cryptocurrencies.  
 
With the exception of the new EU regime on insolvency, there are hardly any legally binding 
frameworks regarding international insolvency. Therefore, in 1997, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a model law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (the Model law). The purpose of the Model law was to “provide effective 
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency”, with focus on cooperation 
between courts or other authorities and foreign states, greater legal certainty for trade and 
investment, fair and efficient administration in the insolvency proceeding that protects the 
interests of all involved, protection of the value of the debtor’s assets and rescue of businesses 
in financial trouble.162 The Model law is accompanied by an explanatory Guide to Enactment 
and Interpretation, which is included following the Model law in order to encourage and assist 
states in adopting the Model law.163 
 
The Model law is not a binding instrument, which means that it needs to be incorporated into 
national law by the individual states. There are two legal theories to incorporation of 
international law in the national law. According to the monist approach, national and 
international law form one single legal order and on that basis the international law can be 
applied directly within the national legal order. According to the dualist approach, 
international and national law should be regarded as two different legal systems meaning that 
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the international law norms need to be adopted into national law in order to be given effect.164 
Notwithstanding its non-binding status, the Model law has been considered the most 
important legal framework in the international insolvency law and as of March 2020, it has 
been adopted by 48 jurisdictions.165 
 
The Model law was adopted in an attempt to harmonize the rules between jurisdictions, since 
this had proven to be troublesome in international insolvency proceedings, as well as to create 
a legal framework in an area that lagged behind in regulation.166 Prior to the Model law, 
cross-border insolvency cases were solved either by ad-hoc court-to-court arrangements or 
through regional instruments, which remained costly and inefficient and lacked transparency. 
The Model law was therefore a daring, but welcome, addition to the international insolvency 
scene.167 However, due to its non-binding nature, some practical challenges have remained 
after the adoption of the Model law, such as problems with inefficiency or disregard of other 
jurisdictions’ rulings or laws and lack of advise regarding the necessary changes to the 
substantive rules that a procedural framework requires. In addition, the Guide to Enactment 
and Implementation has received negative feedback since it does not contemplate cross-
border cases, but only focuses on domestic law. A call for a revisited Model law has therefore 
been discussed, with a special focus on the need for hard law in this area.168  
 
As a result of this, UNCITRAL adopted a new model law on the recognition and enforcement 
of insolvency-related judgments (MLIJ) in 2018. The purpose of MLIJ is to improve 
efficiency and recognition in the international insolvency law and to make international 
insolvency cases more predictable and advantageous as well as to avoid duplication of them. 
MLIJ has so far been met positively, however, one of the limitations that has been brought up 
has been the increased flexibility. Flexibility enables a wide adoption of MLIJ but in the same 
time allows states to modify the text of it. This may lead to inconsistencies in the 
interpretation and application of it, which would be the exact opposite of the goal of the 
model law.169 
	
In 2009, a complementary to the 1997 Model law was adopted called “the Practice Guide on 
Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation” (the Practice Guide). The Practice Guide provides 
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information for courts and IPs about practical matters of cooperation and communication in 
cross-border insolvency proceedings. The Practice Guide provides a reference source of 
issues that commonly arise in cross-border insolvency proceedings with clauses and 
techniques to help solving these issues.  
3.1.2. Nordic Bankruptcy Convention 
	
The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention (the Convention) was entered into on 7 November 1933 
between the Nordic countries and is still in force. The Convention has provided a legal 
framework for automatic recognition and enforcement of personal and corporate bankruptcies 
between the countries. This means that a bankruptcy opened in one Nordic country comprises 
all assets and liabilities that the debtor owns also in the other Nordic countries, the law of the 
country in which the insolvency proceeding is opened is applicable unless an exception is 
present and the bankruptcy administrator is authorized to dispose of all assets of the 
bankruptcy estate, regardless of which state they are located in (universality theory). The 
Convention is only applicable to bankruptcies; other insolvency proceedings do not fall within 
the scope of the Convention.170  
 
The background to the Convention was that the representatives from the Nordic countries saw 
the advantages of a mutual bankruptcy framework due to the increase in trade in the Nordic 
region, which would eventually lead to more cross-border bankruptcies.171 According to 
professor Michael Bogdan, there is hardly any published case law on Inter-Nordic 
bankruptcies. The aims of the Convention can, therefore, be considered achieved and the legal 
instrument per se successful.172 Nevertheless, the Nordic Bankruptcy Convention is nowadays 
replaced by the European Insolvency Regulation (see section 3.2.1) in Finland and Sweden, 
but is still applicable in Denmark, Norway and Iceland.173 
 
The Convention would be moot in regard to cryptocurrencies first of all since the Convention 
is a so-called single convention, which means that it only covers recognition and enforcement 
of foreign legal decisions, whereas a “double convention” would also contain jurisdictional 
provisions. 174  This means that it does not provide any answers to jurisdictional and 
substantive questions, this is still up to the states domestic legislation. Secondly, the 
Convention is only applicable on domiciliary bankruptcies, i.e. bankruptcies that have been 
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issued by a court in the jurisdiction where the bankruptcy entity is domiciled or has its 
registered office and not at all on non-domiciliary bankruptcies. This is similar to the 
problems with the principle of COMI.175  
 
Thirdly, the question of applicable law becomes very important since there will be only one 
bankruptcy proceeding. Pursuant to the Convention, the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
bankruptcy was declared is favored (the lex concursus) and the Convention states a few 
matters that this law shall cover.176 However, there are a few exceptions from the lex 
concursus according to which the law of another Nordic State is applicable instead of the law 
of the state where the bankruptcy was declared. One example of the exceptions is that 
property that is not liable for seizure for any claim under the law in which the property is 
situated shall not be included in the bankruptcy estate.177 In addition, the Convention contains 
several provisions regarded where assets shall be deemed to be situated, but taking into 
consideration that the Convention was entered into in 1933, the provisions are meant for hard 
assets and do not work well on intangible assets. However, the simple structure and strong 
universality principle of the Convention should still be taken into consideration for future 
regulation.  
3.1.3. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat 
	
The Council of the International Bar Association (IBA) adopted the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Concordat (the Concordat) in 1995, in the view that “an insolvency regime which is 
reasonably predictable, fair and convenient can promote international trade and 
commerce”.178 The aim of the Concordat was to create a legal framework for harmonizing 
cross-border insolvency proceedings since there was no “uniform statute or treaty adopted by 
commercial nations dealing with the policy and commercial problems that arise in cross-
border insolvencies” at the time, and to deal with the issues and downfalls of global 
commercial deals.179 The Concordat provides ten general principles, which do not have the 
force of law, but which should be taken into consideration in cross-border insolvency 
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proceedings. The Concordat is still in force but in 1997 the UNCITRAL Model Law overtook 
its use and today the Concordat has little relevance.180 
 
Albeit its short lifetime, the Concordat was successfully applied on a cross-border insolvency 
case and could demonstrate the positive factors of an international agreement. Everfresh 
Beverages Inc. was a multinational distributor of beverages with its head office in Chicago 
and operations in Illinois, Michigan and Ontario. When facing financial distress, the company 
filed for a reorganizational proceeding both in Toronto under Canadian law and New York 
under US law. The judges in Toronto and New York encouraged the company and its 
creditors to co-ordinate the two proceedings in accordance with the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Concordat. In less than five weeks, the company, its major operating lender and the US 
Creditors’ Committee had developed a cross-border insolvency protocol, based on the 
Concordat. The protocol dealt with administration and sale of assets in both jurisdictions, 
distribution of the proceeds of sale, co-ordination with creditors’ claims and made up a plan 
for the reorganization of the company. The protocol was a success and both courts approved 
the protocol in the same day.181 
 
Already in 1999, David H. Culmer regarded the creating of the Concordat to be a sign of the 
direction that the international insolvency law was to go in resolving cross-border insolvency 
issues, and promoted that a treaty would be necessary to fill the void in especially 
international bankruptcy law.182 Prior to the Concordat many other attempts to harmonize 
rules or unify the insolvency law in order to facilitate cross-border insolvency proceedings 
had failed, mostly due to the lack of interest in such treaties and the perception that 
insolvency law is a private law matter. But Culmer argues that the Concordat is a sign of a 
special customary international law that has progressed within the cross-border insolvency 
law. Certain principles of the Concordat get along well with the sources of international law, 
such as the right of official representatives to receive notice of and to appear in all 
proceedings and the use of limited proceedings, hence these should be regarded as indications 
of what customary international law in insolvency law might become. 183 
 
Some of the principles of the Concordat agrees with the function of cryptocurrencies, for 
example that a single administrative forum should have responsibility for insolvency entities 
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with cross-border connections,184 and that this one forum administrates and collects all of the 
assets and is recognized by other forums.185 If there is more than one forum, official 
representatives of each forum shall have the right to appear and be heard in any fora,186 and 
that courts of the forum will not give effect to acts of state of other jurisdictions used to 
invalidate otherwise valid pre-insolvency transactions.187 
 
However, the Concordat also states that if there is more than one plenary forum but no main 
forum the territoriality principle will apply, which do not work well with borderless 
cryptocurrency. In these situations, each plenary forum should also apply its own ranking 
rules for classification and distribution to secured and privileged claims, which enhances the 
risk of divergences of claims.188 In addition, the single administrative forum in principle 1 
should be where the entity has its “nerve centre” and “many of its assets in one country”, 
which, as mentioned before, is undesirable regarding cryptocurrencies.189 
3.1.4. The Bustamante Code  
 
The Bustamante Code (the Code) is a treaty intended to establish rules about private 
international law in the Americas and was signed at Havana and put into force in 1928 by 15 
states. The treaty consists of 437 articles, which constitutes of an introductory section and 
four books titled International Civil Law, International Commercial Law, International 
Criminal Law and International Law of Procedure. The fourth book, International Law of 
Procedure, contains specific provisions relating to cross-border insolvencies, e.g. Articles 328 
and 329 and 414 to 422. 190 The Code provides that jurisdiction is established according to the 
debtor’s domicile. If the debtor has several domiciles, proceedings may be opened in each 
state where domicile is found. The Code allows for recognition of orders given in other 
member states and extraterritorial effect is given to the insolvency proceedings. The powers 
of the insolvency administrator are also to be recognized by the courts of other states.191  
 
The success of the Code has been disputed. Some scholars have been positive about the Code 
and claim that its large membership proves evidence of its success,192 while others propose 
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the need for a revision of the Code. In order to become a success, the number of ratifiers must 
be extended, the provisions in the Code that make ratification almost meaningless must be 
withdrawn and some provisions be amended, for example the provisions regarding choosing 
between national law and the law of the domicile, which often leaves the decision to local 
law.193 In regard to cryptocurrencies, it can be ascertained that the basic problems of the Code 
are domicile and territoriality.  
3.2. European Level 
3.2.1. European Insolvency Regulation and Restructuring Directive 
	
The European Insolvency Regulation194 (the EIR) is an EU Regulation concerning the rules of 
jurisdiction of cross-border insolvency proceedings and was passed in 2000. The EIR is based 
on the universality approach, with the principle of COMI. However, it is generally agreed that 
the EIR uses a form of  “mitigated” or “coordinated” universalism. This universalism model 
can be regarded as a combined model of universalism and territorialism, which means that the 
main proceedings can be opened in the member state where the debtor has its COMI and the 
jurisdiction of this proceeding will extend to all assets located in other member states, except 
for assets located in member states where secondary proceedings have been opened. 
Secondary proceedings may be opened in those member states where the debtor has an 
establishment.195 
 
The Model law and the EIR share many similar features, but as opposed to the UNCITRAL 
model laws the EIR does not try to harmonize the legislation between the member states, only 
reduce the conflict of laws between them. While the Model law has been considered the most 
eminent framework due to the large number of adopting nations, in a case of conflict-of-laws 
between the two in jurisdictions that have adopted both, the EIR will take precedence.196 
 
In 2010, INSOL Europe, the leading European organization of professionals who specialize in 
insolvency, published a report on the weaknesses of the EIR. The most noticeable weakness 
found was the divergence between member states’ national laws in regard to a) the eligibility 
and criteria for the opening of an insolvency proceeding, b) the general stay on the creditor’s 
powers to assert and enforce their rights after the commencement of insolvency and 
reorganization proceedings, c) the rules with respect to the management of the insolvency 
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proceedings, d) the different rankings of creditors, e) the rules on the process of filing and 
verification of claims, f) responsibility for proposal, verification, adoption, modification and 
contents of reorganization plan, g) avoidance and “claw-back” actions, h) termination of 
contracts and mandatory continuation of performance, j) liability of directors, shadow 
directors, shareholders, lenders and other parties and l) qualifications and eligibility for the 
appointment, licensing, regulation, supervision and professional ethics and conduct of 
insolvency representatives.197 In regard to cryptocurrency, the main issue with the EIR is the 
principle of COMI, which will be further examined later in the thesis.  
As a response to the report, a recast of the EIR was adopted (R-EIR) in 2015, which applies to 
all insolvency proceedings opened after 26 June 2017.198 The R-EIR is binding legislation for 
all member states except Denmark, who decided to opt-out of both EIR and R-EIR. The most 
important change in the R-EIR, compared to EIR, was the addition of a chapter concerning 
group insolvencies. In addition, the European Parliament also recommended specifying the 
concept of COMI and establishment and increasing the cooperation between courts.199 
 
In addition to the EIR, the Restructuring Directive200 is an important framework of the EU 
law. The Restructuring Directive came as a supplement to the EIR, since the EIR provides for 
rules governing the allocation of jurisdiction for the opening of insolvency proceedings, but 
does not address or regulate disparities in national laws. The aim of the Restructuring 
Directive is therefore to provide for a harmonized minimum restructuring standard across the 
EU. The three main aims of the Restructuring Directive are (1) to ensure that member states 
have a preventive restructuring framework - which includes a restructuring plan; (2) to ensure 
that entrepreneurs have a second chance through an effective debt discharge mechanism; and 
(3) to ensure that member states put in place measures to raise the efficiency of restructuring, 
insolvency and discharge of debt procedures more widely. The Restructuring Directive does 
not attempt to harmonize the substantive insolvency rules.  
3.2.2. Istanbul Convention 
 
In the 1980’s, the Council of Europe established a committee of governmental specialists with 
the sole purpose of creating a bankruptcy convention. This led to the adoption of the 
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European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy in Istanbul, 1990. The 
aim of the convention was to “achieve a greater unity between its members” and to 
“guarantee a minimum of legal co-operation by dealing with certain international aspects of 
bankruptcy” since “bankruptcy proceedings […] more and more frequently concern persons 
who exercise activities outside the national territory”.201 In regard to its provisions, the 
convention does not differ significantly from the Model law or the EIR. To this day, only 
Cyprus has ratified the convention.202 The convention can therefore be regarded as a 
considerable failure.  
3.3. Standards and Principles 
 
In addition to the other sources, there are general standards and principles applicable in the 
international insolvency law. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (the 
Legislative Guide) provides a comprehensive statement of key objectives and principles that 
should be reflected in a State’s insolvency law, in order to build a strong and flexible 
insolvency regime. It arouse from a proposal to the United Nation Commission in 1999, 
according to which UNCITRAL should expand its work on corporate insolvency law to 
encourage the adoption of effective and harmonized national insolvency laws. The first draft 
of the Legislative Guide, which contains part I and II, was finalized and adopted in June 2004. 
In its preparatory work, representatives from the Commission’s 36 members states took part, 
as well as representatives from other states and international, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations.203  In 2010 and 2013, part III and IV were added to the 
Legislative Guide, which focuses on the treatment of enterprise groups and the obligation of 
the decision makers of the enterprise.204 
 
Another set of principles regarded important are the World Bank’s “Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights System” (the Principles). The Principles offer a framework 
for analyzing and improving the effectiveness of domestic insolvency and creditor/debtor 
rights (ICR). The Principles are based on international best practice and are flexible enough to 
be applied to insolvency proceedings in different countries and legal systems. They were 
originally developed in 2001 in the wake of the financial crisis in emerging markets in the 
90s, but have been reviewed and updated in 2005, 2011 and 2015. 
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A forerunner to the Principles of the World Bank can be regarded the “Orderly and Effective 
Insolvency Procedures” that was published by the IMF in 1999. The purpose of the report was 
to create a predictable international insolvency mechanism for the benefit of both 
multinational debtors and creditors and through this, to strengthen the global marketplace. As 
opposed to the Principles, the report does not establish any particular methods for this but 
only provides different major policy choices that states should address.   
 
In 2012, the International Insolvency Institute presented the non-binding “Global Principles 
for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases” (the Global Principles). The Global 
Principles built further on The American Law Insitute’s Principles of Cooperation among the 
member states of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and was made to 
cover all jurisdictions all over the world. The work was made to present the need to address 
the issues associated with insolvency in a cross-border context and the aim of the Global 
Principles is to “facilitate the coordination of the administration of international insolvency 
cases involving the same debtor”.205 Like the earlier frameworks, the Global Principles relies 
on the concept of COMI when choosing the applicable jurisdiction.  
 
Similar to the Global Principles are the “EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court 
Cooperation Principles” (the Cooperation Principles), which were published in 2014 and 
consists of 26 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles and 18 EU 
Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Communications Guidelines. The Cooperation 
Principles were produced by a team of scholars of Leiden Law School and Nottingham Law 
School and their purpose was to try to overcome present obstacles for Courts in EU member 
states and to strengthen efficient and effective communication between courts in EU Member 
States in insolvency cases with cross-border effects. The Cooperation Principles include 
principles on their non-binding status and their objectives, case management of courts, the 
equal treatment of creditors and principles about the judicial decision, for example the 
reasoning.  
3.4. Private International Law 
 
Private international law, or conflict of laws in other words, is the area of laws that regulates 
(i) jurisdiction, (ii) ways to decline jurisdiction, (iii) choice of law and (iv) recognition and 
enforcement in civil cases with international components, i.e. when there is a conflict of laws 
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situation, the court in question is depending on choice of law rules to decide the applicable 
law to be used.206 Thus, the substance of the private international law is dependent on the laws 
of the state involved and international private law can, therefore, be seen as a mere set of rules 
and principles stipulating where the substantive questions can be solved and which rules will 
apply in order to solve them.207  
 
Choice of law rules can be either unilateral or multilateral. Unilateral rules determine the 
applicable law by asking if a state’s substantive law applies to the case at hand or if the states 
actually have an interest in their law being applied. The possibilities would be that only one 
state expresses interest (the false conflict-pattern), that many states express interest (the true 
conflict-pattern) or that no state expresses interest (the no interest-pattern). The forum is 
entitled to and should apply its law to the two later patterns.208 Multilateralism focuses, on the 
other hand, on the connection between the legal relationship in question and the relevant 
jurisdictions. It assigns the legal relationship to the jurisdiction it “belongs” to, regardless of 
whether this jurisdiction expresses an interest in its law being applied.209 
 
It is important to distinguish between the choice of insolvency law and choice of non-
insolvency law. The general rules of conflict of laws are not usually seen to be applicable in 
cross-border insolvency proceedings “as is”, but needs a little adjustment in order to fit the 
special needs of insolvency proceedings.210 Also, in insolvency proceedings the private 
international law method is used only for selected issues. This means that although one state’s 
law governs the proceeding as a whole, the law of another state may govern some particular 
aspects of the proceeding, for example rights in rem or avoidance and setoff rules.211  
 
Within the European Union, the private international law questions and rules in the area of 
insolvency law are solved through the EIR. Outside the EU, there is no legislative or judicial 
guidance on the proper choice of laws rules. There are some guidelines, though, that should 
be taken into consideration when choosing choice of law rules. Firstly, the universality 
approach should generally be used in the choice of law rules, which would make it compatible 
with the basis of the EIR and the Model law. Secondly, the aim of the conflict of law rules 
should point more towards “conflicts justice” than “material justice” and more towards 
																																																								
206 Crawford 2012, p. 474, Jerker – Svantesson 2012, p. 63 
207 BIS 2002, p. A17 
208 Look Chan 2008, p. 354 
209 Ibid., p. 355 
210 Westbrook et al 2010, p. 239 
211 Ibid., p. 233 
	 42	
“jurisdiction-selecting” rules than “rules-selecting” rules. The reason for this is that the 
homogeneity of results and predictability is of such importance in the insolvency law.212  
 
Thirdly, a hybrid of unilateralism and multilateralism should be used so that the two 
methodologies can complement each other rather than compete with each other; since 
methodological purity is often the ideal but does not work in reality. The multilateralism 
approach could benefit from the essential core of unilateralism by considering the underlying 
purposes, policies or interest when selecting the applicable law. Lastly, the choice of law rules 
should be “narrow and issue-specific, sometimes regulating only a single issue”.213 
3.4.1. Comity of Law 
 
The legislative frameworks and reforms have proven to be slow and inefficient in the 
international insolvency law, due to the divergences in approach between different 
jurisdictions and the absence of international treaties with wide-ranging effect. The ordinary 
principles of international private law are also not designed to fully cope with the complex 
issues of cross-border insolvency.214 Courts and judicial authorities (generally in common law 
jurisdictions) have, therefore, relied on the concept of comity of law, which is a doctrine of 
the private international law.215 Comity is a set of general principles,216 which require that 
foreign judgments be recognized and given effect.217 The concept of comity has emerged as a 
response to the lack of hierarchical system of norms and the horizontal arrangement of state 
jurisdictions in private international law.218 
 
Historically, many transnational bankruptcies in jurisdictions like the US, Canada and South 
Africa have been based on the concept of comity. But what is comity and to what extent does 
it constitute a doctrinal basis for power?219 The principle is illustrated in the In re Culmer 
case. A debtor initiated a liquidation proceeding in a Bahamian court and requested that his 
assets in the US would be included in the proceeding. The US court granted the relief, noting 
that courts should have maximum flexibility and extend comity to foreign proceedings unless 
it would violate American law. The “power” is mostly directed against legislative or judicial 
acts of other states, but not to the sovereign nation. The “active assistance of the court” has 
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neither been considered to fall under the concept. In a way, the concept of comity could 
therefore be seen as a matter of universalism.220 
 
The concept of comity has not always proven to work well, though. In the Floridian class 
action Cryptsy-case221, a receiver was appointed to administer and manage the business affairs 
of an online company intended to facilitate the trade of cryptocurrencies for the public. The 
company was established in 2013 and in 2015 there were allegations that certain Cryptsy 
users had trouble accessing their account. In 2016 a class action lawsuit were commenced 
against the company due to this problem. The receiver was tasked with monetizing and 
securing the cryptounits of the company. The identification and securing of the assets were no 
problem, but the receiver had significant problems with the cooperation of entities abroad, 
which failed to respond to inquiries or demands.  
3.5. Customary International Law 
	
International custom is explained as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. 222 
Thus, the “evidence” should be seen in light of two questions: is there a general practice? And 
is this practice accepted as international law?223 Customary international law (CIL) is a 
recognized legal source in international law that can fill gaps and influence existing 
instruments. 224  For a practice to be regarded as customary international law complete 
uniformity or complete consistency of practice is not required, a substantial conformity have 
been regarded to be enough.225 Once CIL has become pervasive enough, states are bound by 
it.226 
 
CIL should be distinguished from the “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations”, which is a source in international law close to CIL but still constitute a separate 
source of law. They should be looked at merely as a complement to CIL, and not a part of it. 
The main difference is that the “general principles” seek to define the “fundamentals of 
substantive justice and procedural fairness” and are based on “the universal understanding of 
basic legal concepts by all legal systems” while CIL is more adaptable by nature and take 
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different social and cultural aspects into consideration. They might therefore vary from 
society to society.227 
 
Although CIL has not generally been regarded to be applicable in the international insolvency 
law (which is more bound by the rules of international private law), some scholars argue that 
the concept of modified universalism and the principle of comity may be emerging as CIL 
and that the line between public and private international law has become blurry. 228 
According to the modified universality approach, or the ”internationalist principle”, 
”jurisdictions accept the fact that a single court should manage the insolvency and offer such 
a co-operation as they are able to give”.229 Modified universality could be perceived as an 
interim solution whose aim is to achieve pure universality (complete unity and universality), 
which would be the ultimate ideal for an international insolvency treaty.230 However, pure 
universality has been considered very difficult to accomplish, so as for now the modified 
universality ”is the only approach that provides concrete, realistic rules that as such could 
become the leading norm for the system, in the fulfillment of cross-border insolvency’s 
international role”.231 
 
The principle of comity has also been argued to be emerging as CIL (or at least to a general 
principle of international law) and the advocates claim that “through the concept of comity, 
private international law has pursued internationalist goals, specifically where comity 
provided prominent ground for the obligation to apply foreign laws”. The principle of comity 
has been criticized as emerging as CIL by the opponents, who state that “comity has been 
exercised by a rather limited number of countries and has not been widely practiced. It is 
applied in different ways in different jurisdictions pursuant to local understanding of the 
notion, and it is more prevalent in countries with a common law tradition”. In addition, the 
concept of comity has been described as being too ambiguous. 232  
 
In comparison to the principle of comity, the concept of modified universalism has stronger 
arguments for being considered CIL, though, due to it already being quite dominant, widely 
applicable and flexible. CIL as a supplement to international frameworks, such as the Model 
law, could also be used as a tool to overcome territorialist biases. In order to transform 
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modified universalism to CIL, however, the aspiration for pure universalism would have to be 
ceased and instead the modified universalism should be specified and widened. Since both the 
EIR and the Model law have, to some extent, already adopted the modified universalism, it 
should be no problem to develop it even further.233  
 
The limitations of CIL in the international insolvency law, however, are that it tends to be 
rather vague and unclear. It is difficult to ascertain at what point the rules could be applied as 
CIL and since CIL rely on domestic legal enforcement mechanisms, it is often not taken 
notice of. It has therefore been criticized for having little impact on domestic cases, especially 
cross-border cases.234 Nonetheless, considering an international insolvency system, CIL could 
be a useful method in shaping the interactions within the system. CIL is responsive to 
emerging trends,235 and since we have seen a trend toward the universalist approach, which 
works better in global insolvency cases, CIL is plausible to gain more relevance in the future.  
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4. Regulation of Cryptocurrencies – What is the Proper 
Regulatory Scheme?  
4.1. Code as Law – Using Blockchain to Regulate Blockchain  
	
As earlier mentioned, the idea behind bitcoin was to create a means of payment that would 
not be under the control of any authorities, due to the lack of belief in financial institutions 
after the financial crisis. This got the ball rolling and behind the development of new 
cryptocurrencies is still the aspiration for an autonomous system that function without the 
interference of regulators or legislators.236 Since blockchain-based technology does not fit 
very well with our law as it is, the question of whether cryptocurrencies should be regulated at 
all arises, or could the technology be used to regulate itself without regulators intervening?  
In general, IT scholars and practitioners are regulation-adverse and support the so-called 
principle of “technology neutrality”. The principle of technology neutrality claims that “no 
particular technology should be required or assumed both in order to prevent regulation from 
hindering the development of a superior technology, and in order to prevent regulation from 
becoming rapidly obsolete”.237 This means that (a) "technical standards designed to limit 
negative externalities (eg. Radio interference, pollution, safety) should describe the result to 
be achieved, but should leave companies free to adopt whatever technology is most 
appropriate”; (b) “the same regulatory principles should apply regardless of the technology 
used”; and (c) “regulators should refrain from using regulations as a means to push the market 
toward a particular structure that the regulators consider optimal”.238 In regard to insolvencies, 
this means that regulators should obtain from regulating the management of the insolvency of 
debtors with a blockchain portfolio.239 Since 2011, technology neutrality has been recognized 
as a key principle for Internet policy by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).240  
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In the technological world, there has therefore been a strong proposition for non-traditional 
regulation that would take the technology itself into consideration. In a report by the UK 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser is stated: “Both the legal and the digital spheres are 
governed by rules, but the nature of these rules is different. In a digital environment, both 
laws (legal code) and software/hardware (technical code) regulate activity. The impact of both 
must be considered in setting out regulations that cover distributed ledger systems.”.241 
Also professors De Filippi and Hassan set forth that both code and law govern the behavior of 
Internet users. However, they mention that while computer code is more efficient than legal 
rules there are limitations to code since a machine cannot make use of flexibility and 
ambiguity, which are an important part of legal rules. From a positive perspective, though, the 
lack of flexibility and ambiguity in connection with the highly formalized technical rules 
erases the need for judicial arbitration. Law and code often collide and law is becoming more 
and more reliant on code “in order to define the rules that people need to abide by”.242 This 
phenomenon has been described as “code is law” by Lawrence Lessig.243 In his book Code: 
version 2.0, he holds that:  
Cyberspace demands a new understanding of how regulation works. It compels us to 
look beyond the traditional lawyer’s scope—beyond laws, or even norms. It requires a 
broader account of “regulation,” and most importantly, the recognition of a newly 
salient regulator.244  
With the development of blockchain technology, De Filippi and Hassan argue that code will 
take a more prominent role and “the lines between what constitutes a legal or technical rule 
become more blurred”. One of the reasons for this is that legal rules are implemented ex-post 
through judicial intervention of states, while technical rules can be implemented ex ante, i.e. 
the problem will be prevented before it even occurs.245 Another problem with the judicial 
intervention of states is that state jurisdiction stays within domestic borders, while Internet 
and code do not. Code and technology can therefore be used to bypass the law.246 BitTorrent 
can be used as an example. Just like bitcoin, BitTorrent has a decentralized protocol for peer-
to-peer (P2P) file sharing. Without a central point or control, BitTorrent cannot be legally 
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prosecuted and can therefore avoid legal issues regarding copyright laws, for instance.247  
Wright and De Filippi play with the thought that regulation and legal rules simply be replaced 
with software and smart contracts. Smart contracts could be standardized and would make 
legal contracts cheaper, faster and clearer while at the same time make the work of the 
lawyers redundant.248 Smart contracts would also eliminate contractual breaches, since “the 
smart contract’s code immutably binds them to that clause without leaving them the 
possibility of a breach”.249 But could blockchain technology be used to regulate cross-border 
insolvency proceedings, and in particular cross-border insolvency proceedings with 
cryptocurrencies? I.e., can blockchain be used to regulate blockchain?  
Some scholars have demonstrated with evidence of data that an “appropriate use of IT can 
significantly improve cooperation among independent individuals belonging to the same 
groups, and that this operation is increasingly less costly”.250 Mangano suggest that in the 
international insolvency law this would entail “courts and insolvency practitioners setting up 
an IT network which is decentralized in nature (peer-to-peer) by means of a database system, 
including a database model, a database management system (DBMS) and a database; storing, 
organizing and managing those data which are relevant for the proceedings; combining this 
application with other applications which allow courts and insolvency practitioners to retrieve 
data and employ them to perform the operations which will be relevant case by case”.251 
In other words, blockchain technology could be of use in insolvency law if firstly, a 
conceptual data model that reflects the legal framework is designed that determines how data 
can be stored, organized and manipulated. The second task that needs to be done in order for 
blockchain technology to work in international insolvency law is to choose and adopt an 
appropriate database management system that allows users to retrieve, analyze and employ 
data. The third task consists in collecting and storing the relevant data and in processing them 
according to the goals of the proceedings. 252 
The designer of the data model would have to take into account whether the legal 
environment should be universalistic in nature, how the universalism should be arranged, how 
many courts and IPs are involved, what is the purpose of the insolvency proceedings opened 
etc. According to Mangano, cooperation would be the emphasis in blockchain regulation, 
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which means that the database model would have to be molded in accordance with basic 
cooperative universalism or EU-style cooperative universalism. The basic cooperative 
universalism means that the model will correspond to a legal framework that provides the 
opening of many “independent proceedings” and the EU-style cooperative universalism to 
one set of main proceedings that is “dominant” and other territorial proceedings, which are 
“dominated”. The designer would have to mold a network in accordance with the law of a 
certain jurisdiction and the decisions taken by their courts or IPs and combine these to a larger 
network, creating a “network in a network”. 253 
Nevertheless, blockchain regulation requires that the network is based on a legal framework 
and that different jurisdictions cooperate in the matter. Rules about the use of blockchain 
regulation will therefore have to be implemented in existing frameworks, for example articles 
in the UNCITRAL Model law about suggesting jurisdictions to use peer-to-peer networks to 
improve cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. Another way would be to facilitate IPs 
to carry out integrated research with IT experts in order to develop special-purpose databases 
or database management systems in the international insolvency law.254 But with the fast 
development of blockchain technology and the growing acceptance of it, regulation through 
blockchain could be a possible solution in the future, especially for borderless assets such as 
cryptocurrencies. 
4.2. Blockchain and the UNCITRAL Works  
	
One way to regulate cryptocurrencies on the international level is to use the existing legal 
frameworks. As mentioned earlier the UNCITRAL Model law and its Guide has been 
considered the most eminent framework and most commonly used in the international 
insolvency law, although it is not legally binding. The Model law would therefore make a 
good takeoff. A review of the Model law would succeed in harmonizing the rules and create 
cooperation between jurisdictions while still maintaining state sovereignty and states’ self-
determination, which is the main argument of many of the opponents to a legally binding 
framework. Especially regarding cryptocurrency, which is a highly opinioned technology, an 
amended Model law could create some guidelines in cross-border proceedings for those who 
have ratified it, while still providing the possibility for states with negative attitudes towards 
them to keep out or to simply leave out some parts of the framework. The use of a non-
binding framework could also be a way to overcome differences and different opinions.255 
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The problem with the Model law, however, is that it merely provides rules about recognition 
of foreign insolvency proceedings and cooperation between foreign courts and other 
authorities. It does not cover substantive insolvency rules. The Model law could therefore not 
establish an answer to the question of how cryptocurrencies should be treated in insolvency 
proceedings. Nevertheless, it could provide some answers to the jurisdictional issues of 
insolvency proceedings involving cryptocurrencies, especially in cases regarding insolvency 
proceedings of crypto-companies or cases where the majority of the debtor’s assets consist of 
cryptocurrencies.  
 
As earlier mentioned, the concept of COMI is fundamental for the operation of the Model 
law. However, the principle of COMI does not work well with blockchain technology. In 
order to cover blockchain-based entities, such as DAOs, or other entities focused on 
cryptocurrency, the definition would have to be amended. In order to do that, we must first 
examine the concept of COMI, which is found in art. 2 of the Model law:  
 (b) “Foreign main proceeding” means a foreign proceeding taking place in the State 
 where the debtor has the centre of its main interests;  
 (c) “Foreign non-main proceeding” means a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign 
 main proceeding, taking place in a State where the debtor has an establishment within 
 the meaning of subparagraph (f) of this article;  
 (f) “Establishment” means any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-
 transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services.  
Hence, the Model law itself does not contain any specific definitions or explanations of 
COMI. The concept is therefore usually interpreted in accordance with the EIR that states: 
 This Regulation enables the main insolvency proceedings to be opened in the Member 
 State where the debtor has the centre of its main interests. Those proceedings have 
 universal scope and are aimed at encompassing all the debtor's assets. To protect the 
 diversity of interests, this Regulation permits secondary insolvency proceedings to be 
 opened to run in parallel with the main insolvency proceedings. Secondary insolvency 
 proceedings may be opened in the Member State where the debtor has an establishment. 
 The effects of secondary insolvency proceedings are limited to the assets located in that 
 State. Mandatory rules of coordination with the main insolvency proceedings satisfy the 
 need for unity in the Union.256 
 Accordingly, the presumptions that the registered office, the principal place of 
 business and the habitual residence are the centre of main interests should be rebuttable, 
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 and the relevant court of a Member State should carefully assess whether the centre of 
 the debtor's main interests is genuinely located in that Member State.257 
Thus, the only information that the EIR provides of the center of main interest is that “the 
registered office”, “the principal place of business” or the “habitual residence” could be 
regarded as the center of main interest. An explanatory report (the Virgos-Schmit Report) that 
was made in connection with the EIR has tried to further explain the concept.258 According to 
the report:  
 The concept of "centre of main interests" must be interpreted as the place where the 
 debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore 
 ascertainable by third parties. 
 By using the term "interests", the intention was to encompass not only commercial, 
 industrial or professional activities, but also general economic activities, so as to 
 include the activities of private individuals (e.g. consumers). The expression "main" 
 serves as a criterion for the cases where these interests include activities of different 
 types which are run from different centres. 
 Where companies and legal persons are concerned, the Convention presumes, unless 
 proved to the contrary, that the debtor's centre of main interests is the place of his 
 registered office. This place normally corresponds to the debtor's head office.259 
This formulation, and in particular the reference to ascertainability by third parties and the 
debtor’s head office, is problematic and would not fit well with the new technological era, 
considering for example that the DAO itself and its stakeholders could be anonymous and that 
the head office could be the Internet. In order to establish jurisdiction in the new technological 
era, the concept of COMI would therefore have to be widened or simply replaced.  
Furthermore, pursuant to the Model law, a foreign insolvency proceeding shall be recognized 
as a “foreign non-main proceeding if the debtor has an establishment within the meaning of 
subparagraph (f) of article 2 in the foreign State” with establishment meaning ”any place of 
operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means 
and goods or services”. 260  The Virgos-Schmit Report provides an explanation of 
”establishment” as follows: 
 For the Convention on insolvency proceedings, "establishment" is understood to mean 
 a place of operations through which the debtor carries out an economic activity on a 
 non- transitory basis, and where he uses human resources and goods.  
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 Place of operations means a place from which economic activities are exercised on the 
 market (i.e. externally), whether the said activities are commercial, industrial or 
 professional.  
 The emphasis on an economic activity having to be carried out using human resources 
 shows the need for a minimum level of organization. A purely occasional place of 
 operations cannot be classified as an "establishment". A certain stability is required. 
 The negative formula ("non-transitory") aims to avoid minimum time requirements. 
 The decisive factor is how the activity appears externally, and not the intention of the 
 debtor.261 
The definition of establishment is therefore not in line with new technological developments 
either and would require an amendment in order to establish jurisdiction and recognition in 
foreign non-main proceedings for non-traditional entities.  
Regarding the UNCITRAL works, there are however other sources that might have effect on 
insolvency proceedings than the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and falls more 
within the substantive realm of the insolvency proceedings. The Model Law on Secured 
Transactions interacts with the insolvency laws and includes a few insolvency principles that 
need to be respected in the event of insolvency of the chargor262 and also have significance in 
regard to blockchain technology. Nevertheless, the changes of the Model law on Secured 
Transactions would relate mostly to the categorization of cryptocurrencies, which is excluded 
from the scope of this thesis.263 	
4.3. Blockchain and the EU  
 
In general, the EU has shown positivity towards DLT and blockchain but has also emphasized 
the importance of regulating it.264 Therefore, in November 2016, an internal task force on 
financial technology (Fintech Task Force) was set up. The three main objectives of the 
Fintech Task Force is (a) to make sure that all policy work across the board is informed by 
and takes account of technological innovation; (b) to assess whether the existing rules and 
policies are fit for purpose in the digital age; and (c) to identify actions and proposals that 
could harness the potential opportunities fintech offers while also addressing the possible 
risks. The Fintech Task Force is still in an early stage but it has set up some pilot projects to 
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further solve existing interoperability issues, such as the European Financial Transparency 
Gateway and the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (the Forum).265 
 
The Forum was created in February 2018.266 The purpose of the Forum is to map key 
initiatives, monitor development and inspire common actions. The forum has established two 
working groups, whose task is to identify and research existing blockchain initiatives 
throughout the EU and beyond. The Blockchain Policy and Framework Conditions Working 
Group focuses on cross-technology and cross-industry issues to define the policy, legal and 
regulatory conditions of blockchain and the Use Cases and Transition Scenarios Working 
Group focuses on the most promising transformative blockchain use cases with an emphasis 
on public sector applications.267 
 
According to a report published by the Forum in 2020, there are uncertainties in the 
blockchain community regarding compliance with existing legal obligations.268 Hence, there 
is a need for a revision of the regulation. In regard to blockchain technology, the new possible 
policy options available to the European Commission would be the wait-and-see269, the 
issuing of guidance approaches270, a new supranational secondary legislation271, the opt-in 
regime272 and regulatory sandboxes273, which all come with their own advantages and 
disadvantages. Regarding jurisdiction, the report states:  
 Regarding jurisdictional questions around blockchains, it has been amply stressed that 
 oftentimes, it is difficult to determine which law applies where blockchain networks 
 span many different jurisdictions. Indeed, the network operators and nodes can be 
 located in different locations (so that different legal systems may apply to them) and 
 equally, the participants in the network such as the contracting parties are also not 
 necessarily based in the same jurisdiction. However, existing supranational legislation 
 such as the I and Rome I regimes appear well-suited to govern related issues, 
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 which indeed do not appear to be specific to blockchains but rather apply to 
 transnational (technical) networks in general. 
The wait-and-see approach would therefore be the answer to the jurisdictional questions of 
blockchain regarding to the report. It is clear, however, that insolvency law was not one of the 
judicial areas thought of when producing the report, since the Brussels Convention 
specifically excludes insolvency proceedings from its scope,274 and the Rome I Regulation 
has in reality small significance in insolvency proceedings since many of the provisions are 
overlapped by the EIR.275 In general, it is clear that both the Fintech Task Force and the 
Forum are in too early stages to extend their range to insolvency law.  
Nevertheless, since the EIR is the highest level binding legal framework in the international 
insolvency law, it would be natural that the EIR would be the main object of amendment to 
extend its scope to include cryptocurrencies and other blockchain technology. But just like the 
UNCITRAL Model law, the EIR only strives to harmonize the international private law rules 
between the member states and would therefore only have significance in regard to the 
jurisdictional rules. The main objective of amendment would therefore have to be the concept 
of COMI.  
In the EIR, the problematic sections regarding COMI in comparison to the UNCITRAL 
Model law are found in article 3(1) (main proceedings) and 3(2) (secondary insolvency 
proceedings): 
 1. The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of the 
 debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings 
 (‘main insolvency proceedings’). The centre of main interests shall be the place where 
 the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis and which is 
 ascertainable by third parties.  
 In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office shall be 
 presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
 That presumption shall only apply if the registered office has not been moved to 
 another Member State within the 3-month period prior to the request for the opening of 
 insolvency proceedings.  
 In the case of an individual exercising an independent business or professional activity, 
 the centre of main interests shall be presumed to be that individual's principal place of 
 business in the absence of proof to the contrary. That presumption shall only apply if 
 the individual's principal place of business has not been moved to another Member 
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 State within the 3-month period prior to the request for the opening of insolvency 
 proceedings.  
 In the case of any other individual, the centre of main interests shall be presumed to be 
 the place of the individual's habitual residence in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
 This presumption shall only apply if the habitual residence has not been moved to 
 another Member State within the 6-month period prior to the request for the opening of 
 insolvency proceedings. 
 2. Where the centre of the debtor's main interests is situated within the territory of a 
 Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to open 
 insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if it possesses an establishment within 
 the territory of that other Member State. The effects of those proceedings shall be 
 restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in the territory of the latter Member State. 
But in addition to these, there are other problematic sections in the EIR, one of them being the 
scope of application with recital 25 stating: 
  This Regulation applies only to proceedings in respect of a debtor whose centre of 
 main interests is located in the Union. 
According to this, the EIR would not be applicable in proceedings where COMI cannot be 
established. This means that certain blockchain-based entities would fall outside the scope of 
it. In addition, the definition of “the Member State in which assets are situated” in art. 2(9) 
excludes decentralized, intangible assets:  
 ’the Member State in which assets are situated’ means, in the case of: 
  (i)  registered shares in companies other than those referred to in point (ii), the Member 
 State within the territory of which the company having issued the shares has its 
 registered office;  
 (ii)  financial instruments, the title to which is evidenced by entries in a register or 
 account maintained by or on behalf of an intermediary (‘book entry securities’), the 
 Member State in which the register or account in which the entries are made is 
 maintained;  
 (iii)  cash held in accounts with a credit institution, the Member State indicated in the 
 account's IBAN, or, for cash held in accounts with a credit institution which does not 
 have an IBAN, the Member State in which the credit institution holding the account has 
 its central administration or, where the account is held with a branch, agency or other 
 establishment, the Member State in which the branch, agency or other establishment is 
 located;  
 (iv)  property and rights, ownership of or entitlement to which is entered in a public 
 register other than those referred to in point (i), the Member State under the authority of 
 which the register is kept;  
 (v)  European patents, the Member State for which the European patent is granted;  
 (vi)  copyright and related rights, the Member State within the territory of which the 
 owner of such rights has its habitual residence or registered office;  
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 (vii)  tangible property, other than that referred to in points (i) to (iv), the Member State 
 within the territory of which the property is situated;  
 (viii)  claims against third parties, other than those relating to assets referred to in point 
While the concept of COMI is important under both UNCITRAL and the EU, the main 
difference is that under the UNCITRAL Model law COMI is applied to determine the degree, 
to which the court must recognize a foreign proceeding. Under the EIR, the concept is used to 
decide which member state takes precedence when insolvency proceedings have commenced 
in multiple jurisdictions within the EU.276 Both legal frameworks uses the concept to decide 
whether the proceeding is a main or non-main proceeding, though, which means that the 
amendments explained in chapter 4.2. also are of relevance in regard to the EIR.  
The Restructuring Directive has little relevance in regard to cryptocurrencies, since its main 
aim is to establish key principles for an effective framework for preventive restructuring and a 
second chance by reducing the length and associated costs of the proceedings and improving 
their quality. The Restructuring Directive does not harmonize key aspects of insolvency, such 
as rules on the conditions for initiating insolvency proceedings, a common definition of 
insolvency, the preferential scheme or the recovery proceedings in general terms and has 
therefore little relevance both regarding jurisdiction and substantive insolvency law.277 In 
addition, pursuant to art. 1(2) of the Restructuring Directive, the Directive does not apply to 
procedures that concern debtors, who are:  
 (a)  insurance undertakings or reinsurance undertakings as defined in points (1) and (4) 
 of Article 13 of Directive 2009/138/EC;  
 (b)  credit institutions as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 
 575/2013;  
 (c)  investment firms or collective investment undertakings as defined in points (2) and 
 (7) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;  
 (d)  central counter parties as defined in point (1) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 
 648/2012;  
 (e)  central securities depositories as defined in point (1) of Article 2(1) of Regulation 
 (EU) No 909/2014;  
 (f)  other financial institutions and entities listed in the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) 
 of Directive 2014/59/EU;  
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 (g)  public bodies under national law; and  
 (h)  natural persons who are not entrepreneurs. 
In conclusion, focusing strictly on insolvency law, the EIR would be the most logical 
framework to amend. However, considering that the EU is one of the largest economies in the 
world and has shown a great interest towards cryptocurrencies and blockchain, some form of 
regulation can surely be expected in the future. In a way or another this regulation will most 
likely affect the insolvency proceedings as well, at least regarding the classification of 
cryptocurrencies, even if the regulation will not be directed towards the insolvency law. One 
possibility is therefore that an amendment of the EIR will not be necessary at all.  
4.4. Regulating Cryptocurrencies through Regulatory Sandboxes 
A regulatory sandbox could be described as a “framework set up by a financial sector 
regulator to allow small scale, live testing of innovations by private firms in a controlled 
environment under the regulator’s supervision”.278 The concept was developed after the 
financial crisis 2007-2008 in a time of rapid technological innovation in order to adapt the 
compliance of innovative companies with financial regulations without smothering the 
FinTech sector rules or diminishing consumer protection.279 Lately the concept has become 
more interesting and current partly because technology per se is thriving and partly because 
”for the first time blockchain technology is creating a divide between the world where 
securities are issued, offered and sold, and the world where law is enforceable; or, to put it 
differently, this is because for the first time blockchain is increasing the transaction costs of 
financial operations in a setting that cannot be either understood or ’cured’ only within the 
boundaries of traditional financial regulation”.280 Regulatory sandboxes have been used in 
countries such as the UK281, Switzerland282, Singapore283, the Netherlands284 and are also a 
part of EU’s FinTech Action Plan285. 
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There are different reasons for the establishment of sandboxes, but the most common one is to 
promote competition and efficiencies in financial services markets through innovation.286 The 
advantages of the sandbox is that a more regulatory and controlling approach is replaced with 
a problem-solving approach, which aims at exploring and investigating new technologies and 
their effect on the markets without actually causing harm to these markets.287 In addition, it 
allows regulators to observe what regulation is necessary or whether regulatory change is 
required at all. The sandboxes have to be designed carefully, though, since general consumer 
protection laws does not necessarily apply and since they trigger the risk of regulatory 
winners and losers in the markets. Since they are only available for a certain amount of 
participants, they cannot be used as a broad regulatory strategy for an entire sector.288 
 
Although there are different kinds of regulatory sandboxes, some common features that they 
generally share are that they “are not limited to a specific part of the financial sector but are 
cross-sectoral”, they “are open to both incumbent institutions […], new entrants […], and 
other firms” and they “are not limited to the testing of regulated financial services, but may 
also include other products or services that enable or facilitate the provision of regulated 
financial services by another party or facilitate compliance solutions […], or new products 
and services that are relevant for customer protection or financial stability reasons (e.g. the 
use of crypto-assets to enable access to blockchain technologies)”.289 They typically involve 
different phases, such as the application phase, preparation phase, the testing phase and the 
evaluation phase.290 
The regulatory sandboxes first emerged in the FinTech context, but have now been embraced 
also in other domains, such as data protection.291 Cryptocurrencies, blockchain and its effect 
on financial stability is a common object of the regulatory sandboxes, but it is not impossible 
that regulatory sandboxes could be used as a tool in finding the issues and the right regulatory 
responses to cryptocurrencies and blockchain in the insolvency law in the future. They could 
bridge the divide between cyberspace and the world where law is enforceable, so that it will 
be possible to apply to courts and to successfully enforce the law for an IP who intends to 
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make the crypto-assets available to the creditors and enforce both post-commencement 
avoidance rules and fraudulent transaction avoidance rules.292  
One of the challenges that have been mentioned regarding the sandboxes, however, is the 
cross-border cooperation. At the moment, most states are facilitating their sandboxes on 
domestic level. In addition to limiting the test-entities, different facilities applying different 
rules creates the risk for forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage. One further development of 
the regulatory sandboxes should therefore be the enhancement of cooperation.293 
4.5. A New Legal Framework  
4.5.1. In General 
	
In the academic doctrine have been both advocates and critics of a future legally binding 
international treaty in international insolvency law. The advocates propose that in an ideal 
world there would be international agreements to cope with the issues in cross-border 
insolvency proceedings for the stake of the creditor’s,294 and to fill the legal black hole in 
international insolvency.295 In general, global unification of laws would also make the 
governing law more clear and predictable,296 and at least to a degree, produce certain 
advantages in terms of the cost of the credit.297 Some of the critics mean that uniform 
substantive insolvency laws are not likely to be achieved, and even less on an international 
level, due to the insolvency laws being complexly linked to other legal rules and the 
discrepancies between jurisdictions.298 Harmonization of laws would also deprive states of the 
right to implement their own policies and rules about how the creditor and debtor should be 
treated when a business fails.299 
 
Considering that the reason for many of the issues that cryptocurrencies pose in insolvency 
law is due to the lack of regulation and harmonized rules between jurisdictions, it is 
interesting to play with the thought of a binding international legal framework in this field, 
that would include provisions about cryptocurrencies and blockchain. In addition, global 
frameworks have been agreed upon regarding other cross-border phenomena, such as the 
space, the sea and the Internet so naturally, a global framework regarding cryptocurrencies 
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would also be eligible. But although there are advocates for an international treaty, the 
existing literature fail to suggest what the content of such a treaty should be.300 Should it 
focus on choice of law rules and recognition of foreign proceedings like the existing 
frameworks or could it go beyond the jurisdictional questions and be the first to try to 
establish common substantive rules in the international insolvency law?   
 
Some scholars have observed that the difficulty in developing a legal framework within the 
field of cross-border insolvency law lies in choosing between the principles of territoriality 
and universality,301 yet these principles completely disregard the substance of the insolvency 
law applied.302 According to Schier, assuming that an international framework was at hand, 
the first question would be to select the relevant legal system and the rules on which the 
insolvency mechanisms should be based.303 However, a too specific or too general legal 
framework has little normative appeal.304 In addition, a framework too far from the domestic 
legislation would be repellent for a State to adopt; the discrepancies in domestic legislation 
must therefore be taken into consideration. Thinking that everything does not have to be seen 
as black and white, a mix of choice of law rules and substantive provisions could therefore be 
possible.  
4.5.2. Jurisdiction 
 
As to the question of jurisdiction, LoPucki has stated that the territoriality approach would 
work best in the international insolvency law. 305  In comparison to the principle of 
universality, the territoriality principle ”permits the local country to effectuate its rules of 
priority to the maximum extent of its sovereignty” as opposed to the universalist approach 
that ”requires that countries sacrifice not only their sovereignty, but also particular creditors’ 
priority rights”. 306 The universality principle, therefore, is clearly against the most basic 
principle of international law, which is ”the idea that each country has the exclusive right to 
govern within its borders”.307  
 
Furthermore, the territoriality approach offers greater predictability than the universalist 
approach since ”territorial distribution depends on the location of the assets at the time of the 
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bankruptcy filing”. The states where the assets are located would therefore be ”easy to 
determine”. 308 LoPucki also critizes the ”home standard” of the universality principle. It is 
problematic to assume that the state of incorporation would also be the ”home” state, since 
multinational companies can be scattered equally in many states and have little assets or 
activity left in the incorporation state.309 It would therefore be most reasonable that the state 
where the assets are located would handle those assets in an insolvency proceeding. 
 
However, although LoPucki presents some good arguments about the ”home standard”, the 
use of the territoriality principle feels a bit outdated and rhymes poorly with a society that is 
constantly moving towards blurred borders. Moreover, since there is an issue with the 
location of cryptocurrencies, the territoriality approach does not feel like the best option. The 
universality approach would provide a more extensive jurisdiction than the territoriality 
approach and provide the right to cover all assets no matter where they are situated. In this 
case, the IP would only have to establish ownership between the cryptocoins and the debtor to 
be able to seize the assets. The universality principle also avoid the problematic situation of 
conflict of laws,310 which is welcome in regards to an international treaty. However, the 
universality principle does not come without its own problems and especially in cases with 
”difficult” assets, such as intellectual property or intangible assets, the universality principle 
has earlier made the realisation of the assets challenging, due to the difficulties of organizing 
a single legal system to assets located in many different jurisdictions.311  
 
One approach that has been suggested as a suitable option for an international binding legal 
framework is therefore the ”modified universality” approach, which has also been referred to 
as the ”internationalist principle”. According to this, ”jurisdictions accept the fact that a single 
court should manage the insolvency and offer such co-operation as they are able to give, 
bearing in mind the needs for reciprocity and procedural fairness in the treatment of creditors 
overall. The needs of local creditors may still form part of the considerations where it is 
intended that effect be given to orders by the single court in other jurisdictions, thus reserving 
some domestic control compatible with the overall co-operation framework”. 312  This 
approach might be the best solution for traditional cross-border insolvencies, but the approach 
does not state how to ascertain the right jurisdiction for the proceeding. The jurisdictional 
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issues on how to choose the right jurisdiction in regard to cryptocurrencies and other 
blockchain entities therefore remain. 
 
Another approach has therefore been suggested, which helps ascertaining jurisdiction of an 
entity; the ”contractualism” approach. This approach entails that ”each independent corporate 
entity should be allowed to specify in its corporate charter the jurisdiction that will handle any 
bankruptcy proceedings involving that entity”.313 In addition to the choice of forum, the 
contractualism should be extended to choice of law, but these should, however, go hand in 
hand. A firm should not be able to choose select one state as forum and another state’s 
insolvency laws in that forum.314  The pros of contractualism is that the insolvent entity 
usually knows which set of insolvency rules that would best maximize the value of the 
firm,315 which is the goal of insolvency proceedings. If companies were to choose the most 
favorable insolvency laws, it could also lead to a general increase in efficiency in the 
insolvency laws of different states.316  
 
The contractualism approach would work well regarding cryptocurrencies since it erases the 
jurisdictional problems of entities that have no ties to any specific jurisdiction, i.e. to so called 
multi-jurisdictional entities. Internet-based companies could therefore clearly state to which 
jurisdiction it wishes to be regarded as having its ties. In addition, it provides the entities with 
a more profound right of self-determination that would be more in line with the 
”technological neutrality”. The approach has been critized for ”exclusion of interested parties 
in the decision-making process and the (supposedly) pro-debtor choice of insolvency rules 
made by shareholders”. However, the argument is not that well grounded when it comes to 
blockchain entities, since some of these entities (for example DAOs) affects the investors 
more than any third parties. 317  When it comes to companies and other entities, the 
contractualism approach could be the answer, as long as the choice is reasonable.  
4.5.3. Discrepancies in Domestic Legislation 
	
One of the arguments most referred to as to why harmonization or a common legal framework 
would not work are the social, cultural and regulatory discrepancies between different 
jurisdictions. The recent frameworks and developments within the international insolvency 
law could be seen as an indication that the sensitivity of states regarding this field are 
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decreasing and that there is a growing tendency for harmonization of jurisdictional and 
mutual-recognition rules, but it is still one of the most important factors to take into 
consideration when contemplating a common legal framework. Some efforts have been made 
to identify and map similarities and differences between jurisdictions, for example common 
principles and key issues.  
 
The “Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures”-report318 by the IMF was meant to 
discuss the key issues that arose when comparing different domestic legal systems. The 
purpose of the report was not to come up with an international standard, but to propose the 
advantages and disadvantages of possible solutions to the issues. The report distinguishes two 
overall objectives that are generally shared and considered important in most insolvency 
systems. The first one is “the allocation of risk among participants in a market economy in a 
predictable, equitable, and transparent manner”. This objective is important for the economic 
growth and for providing confidence in the credit system. It is generally recognized that the 
”risk allocation rules should be clearly specified in the law” and that the ”insolvency law must 
address the problem of fraud and favoritism”. Closely related to these is also the objective of 
transparency. Judicial proceedings must be open and publicly available and creditors must 
receive adequate information about decisions that are taken.  
 
The second important objective is ”to protect and maximize value for the benefit of all 
interested parties and the economy in general”. One important part of this objective is the 
right of the IP to challenge transactions and contracts that the debtor has entered into before 
the insolvency proceeding, i.e. the antecedent transactions. This objective is further fulfilled 
by the aforementioned objective of equitable risk allocation, but there can also be tensions 
between them. For example, the right to challenge contracts maximizes the value of the assets 
of the debtor but also undermines the predictability of contractual relations.  
 
In addition to the IMF Report, the Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights 
System by the World Bank,319 and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide320 could be used as 
some kind of measurement in solving the problems with discrepancies in domestic legislation 
and finding a common set of rules. Some of the most important principles that these provide 
are the maximization of the value of a firm’s assets and recoveries by creditors, the careful 
balance between liquidation and reorganization, equitable treatment of similarly situated 
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creditors, time, efficient and impartial insolvencies and the ensurance of a transparent and 
predictable insolvency law. It is important to remember, though, that differences between 
domestic insolvency systems should be taken into consideration, but they cannot be 
“marginalized, nor overemphasized”.321 The framework should focus on finding common 
principles and should avoid regulating unnecessary aspects.  
 
In the EU area, an ”Impact assessment study on policy options for a new initiative on 
minimum standards in insolvency and restructuring law” was conducted in 2017 to provide 
the European Commission with different policy options to estimate their impact and to 
produce recommendations for a preferred policy option, in order to define and deal with the 
problem of discrepancies in insolvency regimes. According to the study, the main substantive 
law elements that lead to inconsistencies are differences (a) in access to preventive 
restructuring proceedings; (b) in the involvement of judicial bodies across countries; (c) in the 
opening of insolvency proceedings; and (d) in the rank of claims across jurisdictions.322 
 
One of the options that the study proposes is the establishment of a new restructuring regime, 
which could be chosen instead of the national laws, i.e. it would exist alongside national 
insolvency procedures as an option for the parties initiating the insolvency procedure to 
choose. According to the new regime, jurisdiction would be established on the basis of the 
COMI principle, but the law applicable to the insolvency proceeding would be the ”European 
procedure” rather than the law of the COMI state. The new regime could be applicable to both 
domestic and cross-border insolvencies, but would probably have best effect in cross-border 
cases. The two foremost advantages of a new regime are said to be the decrease in the lenght 
of the proceedings and the proceeding cost savings. The cons of this option, though, is that it 
does not provide regulatory certainty to investors or companies regarding which regime 
would apply and its implementation would take a long time.323  
 
An optional regime would, like the contractualist approach, provide insolvency entities with 
the option to chose, instead of being forced into an unsuitable regime. As the traditional 
structures of companies are changing, an optional regime is a fair idea and would most likely 
be the adequate choice in difficult, cross-border situations in order to have many different 
interests taken into account.  
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4.5.4. Cryptocurrencies 
	
Along with the discrepancies of the insolvency law, the differences in legislation or common 
perception of cryptocurrencies between jurisdictions must also be observed. For example, 
bitcoin is legal in North America, while many states in South and Central America have made 
bitcoin illegal. Some states in the Middle East have not banned them, but they are 
discouraged, while bitcoin is legal and to some extent regulated in Europe and Asia. In Africa 
and Oceania, cryptocurrencies are generally legal but unregulated.324 Only a few jurisdictions 
have incorporated cryptocurrencies in their legal regimes, most in connection with tax 
purposes or money laundering, but a few regulatory approaches can be discerned. 
 
The general regulatory approach taken so far by jurisdictions has been to regulate (a) 
indirectly, by using existing laws and regulations; (b) directly, through cryptocurrency 
specific regulations; (c) the transmission of value, e.g. exchanges between cryptocurrencies 
and fiat money; or (d) not regulate or using the wait-and-see approach.325 The only regimes to 
have specific cryptocurrency frameworks are Japan and the state of New York. The New 
York BitLicense Regulatory Framework was issued in 2015 for companies dealing in virtual 
currency and includes guidelines about key consumer protection, anti-money laundering 
compliance and cyber security,326 and states that bitcoin business activity must be licensed.327 
In April 2017, Japan implemented its bitcoin-regime, i.e. a revised Payment Services Act of 
Japan along with other relevant regulations. The Japanese bitcoin-regime defines virtual 
currencies, requires regulatory supervision of exchanges and introduces capital, cybersecurity, 
operational, employee training and audit requirements.328 
 
In a report from 2019 titled ”Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and 
Virtual Asset Service Providers” the FATF tries to break down the regulatory opinion of 
cryptocurrencies and explain how the FATF Recommendations should apply to virtual assets. 
The report is non-binding and does not try to overrule national authorities but draws on the 
experiences of jurisdictions and intends to assist the national authorities in effectively 
implementing the FATF Recommendations. Especially following elements are considered 
important for states when identifying, assessing and determining how to best mitigate the 
risks associated with virtual assets activities: 
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 a) The potentially higher risks associated both with VAs that move value into and 
 out of fiat currency and the traditional financial system and with virtual-to-virtual 
 transactions;  
 b) The risks associated with centralised and decentralised VASP business models;  
 c) The specific types of VAs that the VASP offers or plans to offer and any unique 
 features of each VA, such as AECs, embedded mixers or tumblers, or other products 
 and services that may present higher risks by potentially obfuscating the transactions or 
 undermining a VASP’s ability to know its customers and implement effective customer 
 due diligence (CDD) and other AML/CFT measures;  
 d) The specific business model of the VASP and whether that business model 
 introduces or exacerbates specific risks;  
 e) Whether the VASP operates entirely online (e.g., platform-based exchanges) or in 
 person (e.g., trading platforms that facilitate peer-to-peer exchanges or kiosk-based 
 exchanges);  
 f) Exposure to Internet Protocol (IP) anonymizers such as The Onion Router 
 transactions or activities and inhibit a VASP’s ability to know its customers and 
 implement effective AML/CFT measures;  
 g) The potential ML/TF risks associated with a VASP’s connections and links to 
 several jurisdictions;  
 h) The nature and scope of the VA account, product, or service (e.g., small value 
 savings and storage accounts that primarily enable financially-excluded customers to 
 store limited value);  
 i) The nature and scope of the VA payment channel or system (e.g., open-versus 
 closed-loop systems or systems intended to facilitate micro-payments or government-
 to-person/person-to-government payments); as well as  
 j) Any parameters or measures in place that may potentially lower the provider’s 
 (whether a VASP or other obliged entity that engages in VA activities or provides VA 
 products and services) exposure to risk (e.g., limitations on transactions or account 
 balance).329 
The report focuses particularly on money laundering and terrorist financing risks and 
regulation but also states that these elements should be taken into consideration when 
regulating other fields, since ”measures taken in other fields may affect the ML/TF risks”.330  
However, other factors must also be taken into consideration when thinking of a legal 
framework in insolvency law, in order to ensure that the cryptocurrencies are dealt with in 
accordance to the policy objectives of the insolvency law. Some of the elements that have 
been mentioned are that (a) the parties with an interest in the cryptocurrency units must be 
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protected; (b) the process of identifying, locating and securing cryptocurrencies must be 
simplified; (c) the manner in which the cryptocurrencies should be liquidated or monetized 
must be clarified; and (d) the manner in which the assets or proceeds should be distributed to 
the stakeholders should be specified.331 However, these elements are very high-level and it is 
difficult to say how this should be accomplished in practice. 
It can be ascertained that the objectives that are generally considered important are similar to 
the risks that cryptocurrencies pose. A good beginning point would therefore be to regulate 
these aspects. However, this is not an easy task either. One way to approach these is therefore 
to look at domestic regulation for guidance. If there is little regulation in general concerning 
cryptocurrencies, there is even less found in the insolvency law. However, a couple of 
jurisdictions have taken the issue of cryptocurrencies in insolvency proceedings into 
consideration, such as Switzerland and Australia.  
In December 2018, the Swiss Federal Council published a report covering the legal 
framework for DLT and blockchain in Switzerland. The report concluded that amendments to 
the existing legal frameworks would have to be made in the area of insolvency law in order to 
cover crypto-assets. In light of these findings, the Swiss Federal Council published a draft law 
in March 2019. According to the draft law, the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act 
should be amended so that segregation of crypto assets for the benefit of creditors shall 
become possible, provided that the relevant crypto assets can be allocated to the entitled party, 
and segregation of digital data in insolvency shall be facilitated.332 This, however, is relating 
to the case where a third party custodian, such as a wallet provider, goes bankrupt. If the 
”owner” of the crypto assets goes bankrupt, the assets will be added to the bankruptcy estate 
if the debtor can prove that s/he holds the keys to the wallet. If access to the wallet requires 
several keys, such a multi-signature wallet requires all of the keys.333 The draft law does not 
contain any provisions about how to identify and secure the assets, though.  
In Australia, the crypto assets will be regarded as an asset of the bankruptcy estate, unless an 
exemption applies pursuant to section 116 of the Bankruptcy Act.334 Similar to Switzerland, a 
trustee will require the relevant public and private keys to secure cryptocurrency. However, 
since the private key is only known to the owner, cooperation from the debtor is vital. 
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Therefore, according to Australian law, a debtor must disclose ownership or interest in any 
asset including ownership of cryptocurrencies to the trustee of his or her bankrupt estate. 
Failure to disclose a cryptocurrency may constitute an offence under the Bankruptcy Act. In 
addition, it will require extra diligence from the bankruptcy trustee to identify whether the 
bankrupt holds cryptocurrency. The trustee should seek and review the debtor’s bank 
statements to identify possible cryptocurrency transactions and electronic evidence should be 
collected to assist investigations of potential evidence of ownership, such as emails, mobile 
applications, QR codes, recovery seeds, Internet browsing history and hardware.335 
Accordingly, the aspects that have been considered the most important in domestic legislation 
are provisions regarding ownership and access to the cryptocurrency. Questions regarding 
how to categorize, monetize or secure cryptocurrency remain unanswered. Regulation of 
these aspects would also be necessary in order to overcome legal uncertainties. However, 
since crypto assets are still a fairly new phenomenon, the regulation should be kept at a 
reasonable level, giving the cryptocurrency time and space to find their right place in society 
and in the insolvency proceedings. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
There are a substantial number of challenges and risks that the cryptocurrencies pose in the 
international insolvency law and the financial stability in general, when they are starting to 
show up as assets in insolvency proceedings of entities and physical persons. In addition, the 
evolving technology brings new operating entities with it, unknown to our traditional 
perception of businesses and companies and to our regulation. The current regulatory 
frameworks, standards and principles, discussed in chapter 3, contain no provisions about 
cryptocurrencies nor are they sufficient to deal with them on an adequate level. The aim of 
this thesis was therefore to look at the possibility of regulating cryptocurrencies in the 
insolvency law by examining the current regulation and looking at some new possibilities as 
well. The thesis focuses on the international level, since both multi-national insolvencies and 
cryptocurrencies go beyond domestic borders.  
 
The international insolvency law is in a way an ungrateful judicial area to examine since it 
lacks a common binding framework. The substantial questions are thus still depending on the 
national state, which is the reason why this thesis focuses in particular on the jurisdictional 
questions. Furthermore, the insolvency law is connected to many other areas of law, which 
makes it difficult to differentiate. Nevertheless, as shown in chapter 2, the risks and 
challenges of cryptocurrencies will also affect insolvency proceedings; hence there is a need 
for regulation in this field. But just as the opinions on the matter, the regulation could be 
performed in many different ways.  
 
Considered to be the most important framework in the international insolvency law is the 
UNCITRAL Model law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The Model law is not binding, but it is 
regarded to have shown a will to harmonize the legal rules within this field, due to the 
relatively large number of ratifiers. It has been stated that the most logical approach to 
cryptocurrencies would be to make use of the Model law. The Model law will not provide 
answers for substantive questions, but could be used to solve the jurisdictional ones, which is 
the main problem of borderless entities facing insolvency proceedings governed by national 
legislation. In addition to the Model law on Cross-Border Insolvency, there are other Model 
laws that has effect on insolvency proceedings and that could be amended to include 
cryptocurrencies.  
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The EU has in general shown great positivity towards cryptocurrencies and blockchain and 
was also one of the first to regulate, although the early focus was on the prevention of 
criminal activities. Nevertheless, today the EU can be regarded as a pro-innovator of 
blockchain technology and has shown a lot of initiatives to research, develop and pilot 
concepts to promote technology, the usage of regulatory sandboxes among others, while still 
focusing on the wait-and-see approach concerning regulation. Considering the attention that 
the EU pays to cryptocurrencies and their potential risks, EU is at least considering regulation 
that will be necessary to cope with the cryptocurrencies.  
 
It is unlikely that the insolvency law will be the area of law in question, though, at least in the 
primeval stage. It is important to remember that blockchain entities are only starting to show 
up, which means that it is a long way before they will emerge as problem-areas in the 
insolvency law of the EU. Nevertheless, since the EIR is the highest-level binding framework 
on the international level of insolvency law, it would make a good starting point. Like the 
Model law, the EIR focuses only on the jurisdictional parts of the insolvency law, and the 
substantive rules are up to the member states to decide.  
 
It has been discussed in the thesis that the concept of COMI, which is the foundation of both 
the UNCITRAL Model law and the EIR as well as of many of the different standards and 
principles in the international insolvency law, will show to be unsuitable in regard to 
cryptocurrencies, and in particular to blockchain based entities. The rules for deciding the 
jurisdiction with the center of main interest is difficult in cases where the entity is not tied to 
any particular jurisdiction. The concept is also problematic in regard to the main proceedings 
and the secondary proceedings, since the secondary proceedings are chartered to jurisdictions 
where the company has an establishment, which is not necessarily true regarding Internet-
based companies. In order to expand the scope to include also cryptocurrencies and other 
blockchain entities, an amendment of the concept of COMI will therefore be necessary.  
 
The amendment of COMI may prove to be very difficult, though, since almost all frameworks 
and principles are based on this concept. It is also very difficult to say if there is need for an 
entirely new approach to decide the applicable jurisdiction or if an amendment of the existing 
COMI would be enough. The concept of COMI has in itself faced a lot of criticism, and for 
that reason it would be logical to turn the eye to a new approach, but the process of 
implementing an entirely new approach would take a very long time, if it even were 
necessary. Today, there is not enough case law neither regarding COMI nor cryptocurrencies 
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that would give an answer to the jurisdictional questions of cryptocurrencies. It is therefore 
only possible to consider these things from a theoretical perspective.  
 
In addition to reviewing current legal frameworks, other regulatory options have also been 
brought up in the thesis. One possible solution that has been provided is the concept of self-
regulation. Since the main point of blockchain technology was to avoid authorities and since 
it does not fit in with existing regulation, is there any possibility for technology to be 
controlled by technology? In the thesis, the principle of “technology neutrality” was presented 
along with a proposition for using blockchain technology to regulate the international 
insolvency law. Technology has created new opportunities for businesses and new business 
models and with the continued development of technology in this Internet-era, the world will 
most likely see a revolution of the world economy and there is a great possibility that 
blockchain technology, may show up in all kinds of transactions and interactions in the future. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine the actual enthusiasm for technology by the general 
public and since it is accompanied by its own disadvantages, the road to code as law seem 
long, particularly when it comes to the insolvency law.  
 
The thesis includes a discussion on the possibility of a wide binding international framework 
in the insolvency law. The topic is not new; it has been highly debated throughout the whole 
20th and 21st century and has equally many advocates and opponents. There have been a few 
examples of successful international conventions, with the Nordic Bankruptcy Convention 
being the most favored, but what most of these have in common are the social, cultural and 
legislative similarities of the ratifiers. A global framework would hardly receive the same 
enthusiasm. However, other possibilities have been proposed, for example the option of a 
regime that would work alongside national laws, or a non-binding framework like the Model 
law. Due to the limitations of this thesis, it is impossible to discuss the subject on a deeper 
level, but the fact remains that our world is shifting towards an international paradigm. 
Companies stretch over several states, employees and students are increasing their 
international mobility and goods and ideas are floating over state borders. This together with 
the increased use of digital borderless technologies is a clear factor that whatever regulation is 
chosen, it should be pointed towards the international direction.  
 
All in all, it is important to keep in mind that many of the issues and problems in this thesis 
are discussed from a rather extreme point of view. In insignificant or uncomplicated cases, 
like the majority of cases will most likely be in the future, the questions of COMI will not 
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create any issues, since the insolvency entity has actual physical ties to some jurisdiction. In 
addition, the categorization of cryptocurrency, which was left out of this thesis, will probably 
play a major role in regulation and it could be possible that a common, global classification of 
cryptocurrencies will both help the cryptocurrencies to find their right place and help the 
frameworks to apply to them. Be that as it may, at this point no one can say what the future 
will hold and this is why it is necessary to explore also the outside-of-the-box possibilities.  
